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The potential of hope appeals as persuasive messages relative to other types of 
emotional appeals is unclear. Hope has been theorized to influence motivation, attitudes, 
and behaviors in meaningful ways; it is also believed to bias cognition toward goal 
achievement. Based on appraisal theories and the dual processing paradigm, a conceptual 
framework for how hope appeals could influence message processing, relative to fear 
appeals, was proffered. It was predicted that hope appeals would bias recipients, such that 
they would not pay close attention to the emotional appeal or recommendations that 
accompanied the appeal in order to maintain their positive mood. Fear appeal recipients 
were expected to counterargue the emotional appeal, but overestimate the quality of the 
accompanying recommendations. Emotional appeal type and recommendation quality 
were expected to interact to influence thought generation. Research questions addressing 
the influence of emotional appeals on recall were also investigated.    
 A 3(Appeal: hope, fear, or rational) x 2(Recommendation Quality: low or high) x 





some support for the predictions was found. First, processing of the emotional appeal was 
examined. Hope appeal recipients generated more supportive thoughts and fewer 
counterarguments than fear appeal recipients. Processing of recommendations was then 
examined. Fear appeal recipients generated more supportive thoughts about 
recommendations than hope appeal recipients. Recommendation quality exerted a strong 
influence on thought generation. Recall of the recommendations and source was also 
examined. Hope appeal recipients recalled more recommendations than fear or rational 
appeal recipients. No interactions between emotional appeal type and recommendation 
quality emerged for the thought generation or recall measures. Theoretical and applied 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Hope Historically 
 Hope is one of the most frequently mentioned emotions in daily conversation 
(Shimanoff, 1984). It is used as a noun (e.g. “hope as a virtue”), verb (e.g., “to hope”), 
and adjective (e.g., “hopeful”); it can characterize a feeling (“hoping against hope,” 
Lazarus, 1999), a trait-based thinking style (“hoping for a solution,” Snyder, 2002); or 
actions one undertakes (“hope as a coping mechanism,” Clayton, Hancock, Parker, 
Butow, Walder, Carrick, Currow, Ghersi, et al., 2007; Farran, Herth, & Popovich, 1995; 
Lazarus, 1999). Hope is considered a foundational element of most major religions, and 
central to beliefs regarding what happens to humans after they die (Eliot, 2005).  
 Interest in the construct of hope has a long and rich history. The ancient Greeks 
believed that hope was the only item left in Pandora’s Box, stuck on the rim as a remedy 
for all the other ills released upon humankind (Eliot, 2005). More often than not, hope 
was viewed within the ancient Greek culture as a foolish means of coping with the 
disappointments of life (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000).  Conversely, the Judeo-Christian tradition 
placed hope as a cornerstone of their faith in God; the importance of hope is mentioned 
approximately 75 times in the Old Testament and 58 times in the New Testament (Eliot, 
2005). Hope is paired with love and charity as the central virtues of Christianity. The 
influential Christian philosopher Aquinas (1274/1947) argued that hope is innately good 
because it comes from God, and therefore should serve as a guiding principle for human 
behavior.  
 In the 20th Century, a secular conceptualization of hope emerged. This secular 
hope was science, acclaimed by some as the panacea and savior of humanity (Eliot, 





argued that hope determined the will of an individual to live, but could ultimately be 
dangerous if harnessed toward specific goals. The experiences within Nazi concentration 
camps illuminates the psychological struggle of hope among captive, desperate prisoners 
yearning for freedom; some are said to have survived because they never gave up hope, 
others because they never had it (Bar-On, 1995).  
 Later in the 20th century, a focus of communicating hope to others with the desire 
to mitigate negative outcomes for people emerged.  In his role as President of the 
American Psychological Association (APA), Menninger (1959) called for research on the 
power of hope, believing that the use of hope in the domain of psychiatric treatment 
would prove fruitful. Not enough was known about hope to provide specific 
recommendations to clinicians at that time. Menninger also thought it was important for 
all doctors to be able to effectively communicate and transmit hope to their patients. 
Menninger’s position was unique for the time; he conceptualized hope as something that 
could be scientifically investigated, quantified, and introduced the potential of hope as a 
powerful tool of persuasion.   
 In response to Menninger’s call, nursing research produced an impressive body of 
scholarship about the role and function of hope within the patient-provider relationship, 
especially within terminal illness contexts (Clayton et al., 2007; Eliot, 2005). Many of 
these investigations are qualitative examinations of patients who possessed hope about 
survival relative to those who did not possess hope. Researchers were especially 
interested in how terminal cancer patients made meaning of their experiences and what 
these interpretations meant for their level of hope and health-related outcomes (Clayton et 





hopeful about their chances of recovery were more motivated to engage in behaviors to 
increase their chance of survival (Eliot, 2005; Groopman, 2003).  Similar research was 
conducted within psychology. Case studies of hopeful and hopeless patients have 
informed clinicians on the importance of patients’ hope levels for potential improvement 
and recovery (Farran et al., 1995).  
 Surprisingly few studies have examined the persuasive effects of feeling hopeful 
or the motivational powers of hope appeals.  In 1994, Kinder lamented that research on 
affect had not examined “the consequences for thought and action of the more powerful 
emotional experiences that may play an important role in political life—anger, fear, hope, 
pride—have so far gone unexplored” (emphasis mine, p. 279). Yet, hope has been 
invoked in various types of communication campaigns, from political contests to public 
health interventions.   
 These invocations, called hope appeals, contain language stressing the possibility 
of desired outcomes, and are strategically used to reinforce the beliefs and behaviors of 
citizens.  Nonetheless, little is known about the persuasive effects of hope appeals 
(Chadwick, 2008; 2011). Quite simply, the potential of hope appeals as persuasive 
messages relative to other types of emotional appeals remains unclear. And, if hope 
appeals are found to be effective at motivating change in message recipients, the 
underlying theoretical rationale is foggy at best.  That is, it is unknown whether any 
effects of hope appeals are due to the communication of hope in the emotional appeal, the 
quality of arguments associated with the hope appeal, or the characteristics of the source 
(i.e., credibility) communicating the hope appeal (or any combination of these variables). 





process. Moreover, this project seeks to examine the comparative use of hope- and fear-
based messaging given that they share particular appraisal patterns.  This study 
investigates the underlying cognitive mechanisms of hope and fear appeals, and argues 
that they have potential to elicit biased processing in message recipients. Indeed, both 
hope and fear are believed to bias cognitive processing of persuasive messages—but the 
kind of biased processing likely differs across emotional appeal types. Research on 
emotions, appraisals, outcomes, and processing will be reviewed with the goal of laying a 
strong theoretical foundation for comparing the effects of hope and fear appeals on 







Chapter 2: Literature Review  
Hope Described  
 Hope is classified in this dissertation as a discrete emotion.1 Emotions are 
intrinsic, evaluative reactions to agents, objects, events, or other stimuli, varying in 
intensity (Lazarus, 1991; Nabi, 1999; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988). They are often 
short-lived, relatively acute, and a response to the appraisal of a stimulus in the 
environment that individuals perceive will facilitate or inhibit their goals (Forgas, 1995; 
Lazarus, 1991). Discrete emotions are associated with action-readiness tendencies, 
meaning that emotions are associated with generally predictable behavior (Fridja, 2007). 
Whereas emotions like disgust elicit a tendency to avoid a stimulus (Nabi, 2002), 
emotions like hope encourage individuals to approach and further appraise the stimulus 
(Lazarus, 1991). Appraisals are most generally defined as evaluative judgments (Lerner 
& Keltner, 2000; Tiedens & Linton, 2001). Individuals appraise elements within their 
environment for significance to personal well-being and goals. These appraisals allow 
individuals to make meaning of their experiences, and whether they should approach or 
avoid the stimulus (Lazarus, 1991). Appraisal theories propose that discrete emotions are 
caused by a set of key dimensions, or appraisals, that direct cognition and determine the 
nature of the emotional experience (Just, Crigler, & Belt, 2007; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; 
Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Termed appraisal tendencies, these cognitive processes orient 
                                                 
1 There is disagreement regarding whether hope should be defined as an emotion or cognitive process (Ben-
Ze’ev, 2000; Snyder, 2002). Averill and Sundararajan (2005) noted that the preference for cognitive-based 
explanations for hope come from its differences with other emotions: "hope does not fit into the traditional 
emotion paradigm: it is too cognitive, has few discernable physiological accompaniments, and it not 
associated with stereotypic behavioral expressions" (p. 156). Lazarus (1999) defined hope as an emotion 
that consists of an “affective blend which, depending on how we understand what is happening, includes 






and influence how individuals understand ongoing changes within their environment. 
Discrete emotion scholars believe the interaction of certain appraisals (termed core-
relational themes by Lazarus, 1991) elicit specific emotions. A pattern of appraisals 
determines the discrete emotion(s) experienced (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). For instance, 
appraisals of importance, uncertainty, and lack of goal-congruence together elicit fear, 
whereas appraisals of importance, uncertainty, and high goal-congruence together elicit 
hope. Each of these appraisals is discussed later in this dissertation. 
 Varied versions of appraisal theory focus on the relationship between appraisal 
tendencies and emotion. Most apply the foundational framework developed out of Smith 
and Ellsworth’s (1985) seminal study on the dimensions of emotions (Frijda, Kuipers, & 
ter Schure, 1989; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Nabi, 1999). Smith and Ellsworth asked 
participants to recall, with as much detail as possible, past emotional experiences. 
Participants were then questioned about the different dimensions present or absent within 
each specific emotional experience. Six central appraisal dimensions were found to 
differentiate emotional states: attention to the stimulus; certainty about the stimulus; who 
or what is in control or responsible for the stimulus; pleasantness of the stimulus; 
perceived obstacles presented by the stimulus; and anticipated effort needed in response 
to the stimulus (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Studies have shown that each discrete 
emotion can be defined by a distinct combination of appraisals (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; 
Just et al., 2007; Keltner & Lerner, in press; Lerner & Kelter, 2000; Nabi, 2002; Tiedens 
& Linton, 2001). Moreover, identification of appraisals can provide predictive power in 
terms of how to induce an emotional state (Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Nabi, 2010; Smith & 





understanding the appraisals underlying emotions provides theoretical value with regard 
to the attributes of emotional appeals (Nabi, 2010). Appraisal theory is critical for 
understanding why people may experience different emotions under the same 
circumstances, and the same emotions under very different circumstances (Just et al., 
2007; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).  
Appraisals of Hope 
 Appraisal theory is well-suited to provide theoretical explanation for more 
complex emotions like hope (Frijda et al., 1989; Chadwick, 2011; Just et al., 2007; 
Lazarus, 1999). Hope is contextually determined through cognitive evaluation of the 
environment and affective reactions to contextual variables therein.  The appraisals most 
pertinent to hope are: uncertainty, goal congruence, pleasantness, and importance (Smith 
& Ellsworth, 1985).  
 The association between hope and its appraisals has been documented 
empirically. Frijda et al. (1989) asked participants to recall 32 emotional experiences and 
fill out questionnaires on appraisals and action readiness tendencies associated for each 
experience. Hope was better predicted by its associated appraisals (uncertainty and goal 
congruence) and action tendencies (approach) than were other emotions included in their 
study.  A more elaborate discussion of each of these appraisals is presented next.  
 Uncertainty. The most important appraisal associated with hope is uncertainty 
(Ben-Ze’ev, 2000; Frijda et al., 1989; Lazarus, 1991; 1999; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; 
Snyder, 2002). Hope requires that some type of unsatisfactory element exists within our 
life experiences threatening perceptions of wellbeing or goal attainment (Lazarus, 1999). 





are many situations in which the outcome is unknown and unpredictable. At a minimum, 
individuals must not be certain about the possibility for the target being appraised: 
“certainty creates no space for hope; uncertainty creates space for hope” (Nunn, 2005, p. 
67). Therefore, uncertainty is considered a necessary (but not sufficient) appraisal for 
hope to occur (MacInnis, de Mello, & Patrick, 2004; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Notably, 
uncertainty is also a critical component of fear. 
 Whereas some theories argue hope is determined by a probability judgment, most 
accept that it is the appraisal of possibility instead that elicits hope (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000; 
MacInnis & de Mello, 2005; Snyder, 2002). Therefore, the subjective appraisal need not 
be reflective of actual events; probability estimation is a cognitive process that can be 
accurate or easily biased (MacInnis & de Mello, 2005). The relationship of probability 
and level of elicited hope has not been empirically investigated; it is assumed that a 
variety of moderating and mediating factors influence the relationship (Lazarus, 1999). 
Therefore, hope can be experienced when the perceived probability of the goal congruent 
outcome is relatively low or relatively high; possibility is the necessary minimum 
(MacInnis & de Mello, 2005; Ben-Ze’ev, 2000).    
Tiedens and Linton (2001) examined how discrete emotions and appraisals of 
certainty influenced probability judgments of future events. Participants were first asked 
to recall an event that made them feel happy, disgusted, fearful, or hopeful. These 
emotions were chosen for investigation because of their varied appraisals of certainty.  
Happiness and disgust are elicited in part because of appraisals of certainty, and fear and 
hope are defined by uncertainty. After writing about an auto-biographical experience 





unrelated, study. This second study asked about perceptions of what would happen in the 
year 2000, from baseball records being broken to gay marriage being legalized (the study 
was conducted in 1998). In addition to indicating their belief about whether the described 
event would occur, participants were also asked to rate the certainty of each judgment. 
Results indicated that participants who were induced to feel the more certain emotions 
(happiness and sadness) were also more certain about their judgment of future events.  
This study demonstrated that appraisals of certainty are associated with particular 
emotions and color subsequent perceptions and decisions.  
 The level of uncertainty can affect what emotions are experienced in conjunction 
with hope.  When uncertainty is low, positive emotions such as confidence and happiness 
may be elicited along with hope (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988). When uncertainty is high, 
negative emotions accompany hope (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Lazarus, 1999). Hope can 
be elicited when an outcome that was certain becomes uncertain, and especially when an 
event that seemed impossible becomes at all possible (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000). Interestingly, 
both hope and fear hinge on appraisals of uncertainty and importance.  Hence, hope and 
fear only differ in appraisals of goal congruence and pleasantness—making these two 
emotions ideal for comparison (see Table 1).   
 Goal Congruence. Goal congruence, also conceptualized as perceived obstacles 
(MacInnis et al., 2004; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), is defined by the perception of whether 
a current event or future events are consistent with an individual’s goal (Fridja et al., 
1989; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Goal congruence represents the cognitive element of 
hope. Without evaluation, individuals cannot assess the certainty or the potential of 





experience in which an individual had felt hopeful, remembering the positive situational 
context was associated with motivation to expend effort to overcome other perceived 
obstacles (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988).   
 Pleasantness. Pleasantness is conceived as a secondary appraisal of goal 
congruence in this dissertation. Empirical investigation has demonstrated that it is highly 
correlated with goal congruence (r = .91, Fridja et al., 1989). Pleasantness is defined as 
the degree of pleasure one derives from a stimulus (Lerner & Keltner, 2000). Appraisals 
of goal congruence are inherently pleasant; inferring goal incongruent information elicits 
feelings of unpleasantness.   
 Importance. Perceived importance, also conceptualized as involvement, is a 
central variable to the persuasion process (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986) as well as being an emotion appraisal. It is generally agreed that all emotional 
experiences depend upon importance for a stimulus to cause emotion. Investigations of 
positive and negative emotions have shown that importance is a key element to eliciting 
either type of affect (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Research has also shown that hope is 
associated with higher levels of perceived importance than most other emotions 
(Ellsworth & Smith, 1988). It is believed that appraisals of importance (and/or 
involvement) are necessary to focus attention and generate emotional reaction, and that 
relevance of the emotion causing event may moderate the intensity of hope experienced 
(MacInnis & de Mello, 2005).  Ben-Ze’ev (2000) asserted that the emotion of hope 
cannot be elicited unless an individual “cares intensely” about the outcome, but this 





  Appraisals provide understanding the underlying mechanisms and persuasive 
potential of discrete emotions. Moreover, the examination of appraisals allows for 
interesting comparisons among emotions. For instance, both hope and fear are emotions 
that motivate individuals to engage in behavior to achieve their goals (de Mello, 
MacInnis, & Folkes, 2002). 
Hope versus Fear 
 Understanding the causal outcomes of hope appeals is best achieved by 
employing useful comparison groups whereby hope can be evaluated against other better 
understood emotions—such as fear.  Fear is defined as a “negatively valenced emotion, 
accompanied by a high level of arousal, and is elicited by a threat that is perceived to be 
significant and personally relevant” (Witte, 1998, p. 424). Fear can cause a variety of 
conscious or unconscious responses, including physiological manifestations such as 
increased blood pressure and heart rate or shaking of extremities. Research on the effects 
of feeling fearful and fear appeals has enjoyed a central position in social science 
research for over 50 years (Hovland, Janis, & Kelly, 1953; Janis, 1967; Mongeau, 1998; 
Rogers, 1975; Witte, 1992; Witte & Allen, 2000).  That is, the persuasive, emotional, and 
cognitive effects of fear are fairly well established, whereas little is known about hope. 
Table 1: Appraisals of hope and fear 
 











































In terms of appraisals, hope and fear are often discussed colloquially as two sides 
of a coin (Chadwick, 2011; Lerner & Small, 2002; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Some of 
the comparisons and contrasts are quite clear—hope is a pleasant emotion and fear is an 
unpleasant emotion. Both hope and fear elicit attention, due to the appraisal of the 
stimulus’ importance (necessary for many types of emotional arousal). Both fear and 
hope are associated with uncertainty of varying degrees.  Both emotions are characterized 
by the appraisal of possibility to attain positive outcomes, or to avoid negative outcomes. 
At least one empirical investigation found that hope and fear are orthogonal constructs 
when the context is non-threatening (de Mello et al., 2002). What separates hope and fear 
is the appraisal of goal congruence. Individuals appraising circumstances as moving them 
toward a desired goal will feel hopeful; individuals perceiving that circumstances are 
impeding or moving them away from the possibility of attaining a desired goal will feel 
fear. Hope appeal recipients will appraise the situation as pleasant, while fear appeal 
recipients will find the situation unpleasant.   
  There are important implications derived from this literature comparing hope and 
fear.  Given that this dissertation is attempting to understand and test the cognitive and 
affective outcomes of hope appeals, comparing fear appeals with hope appeals allows for 
more precision in determining the source of any empirical effects.  If one were to simply 
compare hope appeals with a so-called “rational” appeal and find effects for the hope 
appeal, it would still be unclear if the effects were due to hope or due to the fact that the 
appeal was emotional.  Comparing hope with fear (relative to a neutral baseline) and 
measuring the underlying appraisal patterns, however, allows for investigation of 





uncertainty mediates the relationship between an emotional appeal and cognition, then we 
would expect no differences between fear and hope appeals (i.e., both emotions are 
induced by some level of uncertainty).  However, if the appraisal of goal congruence 
mediates the relationship between the emotional appeals and cognitions, then we should 
expect differences between fear and hope appeals. Thus, this juxtaposition of hope and 
fear allows researchers to determine (a) the message features that might be present in a 
hope appeal differentiating it from a fear appeal, (b) the cognitive outcomes of fear and 
hope appeals and (c) the reason why similar persuasive outcomes are expected of fear and 
hope appeals.  The subsequent sections of this dissertation will review features of hope 
appeals, expected cognitive outcomes, and finally expected persuasive outcomes of hope 
appeals.    
Message Features and Hope Appeals    
 Unfortunately, with regard to understanding if and why hope appeals are 
persuasive, communication researchers have little in the way of published empirical 
research to offer. Whereas hope has been investigated within literature, art, and cultural 
studies, it has received scant attention within the social sciences (Braithwaite, 2004). 
Marketing research has proposed potential message strategies that can be used to induce 
hope in consumers (MacInnis et al., 2004; MacInnis & de Mello, 2005; MacInnis & 
Chun, 2007). The majority of this scholarship is conceptual, with propositions about the 
potential effects of hope on consumer behavior grounded in past research on appraisal 
theory, emotion, and marketing. MacInnis et al. (2004) identified four antecedents to 
feeling hopeful that marketers target with communication strategies to induce feelings of 





their goals; marketers can present their product as a tool to overcome the perceived 
obstacles.  Consumers have also often suffered disappointment when trying to obtain a 
goal; marketers can demonstrate how their product will alter future experiences and allow 
consumers to obtain the goal (notably similar to the idea of goal congruence). MacInnis 
and colleagues also proposed that consumers perceive less control when striving toward a 
goal; so, marketers can claim their product gives the consumer more control over 
achieving the goal. Finally, marketers seek to demonstrate that their product may be a 
new way to achieve a goal, or may increase the luck of the consumer to achieve a desired 
goal (i.e., the outcome is uncertain; but, the uncertainty is low). By targeting these 
appraisals associated with hope, marketers seek to persuade consumers that a desired 
outcome can be achieved through consumption of their product. Unfortunately, these 
propositions have not been submitted to empirical investigation and analysis, making it 
impossible to talk about any effect size associated with hope appeals on experienced hope 
or persuasion (in this case, intention to buy the product). 
 In a recent conference paper, Chadwick (2011) noted that hope appeals are 
frequently used without any type of theoretical guidance and argued that a comprehensive 
theory of the effects of hope and hope appeals is needed. Past research on feeling hope, 
appraisal theory, and discrete emotion theory were synthesized to develop the framework 
for Persuasive Hope Theory (Chadwick, 2011). Her inaugural empirical investigation 
tested for correlations between the established appraisals of hope and subjective feelings 
of hope; it also attempted to predict subjective feelings of hope from the appraisals used 





 Chadwick’s (2011) study consisted of a 2 (Hope Appeal: weak/strong) x 2 (Topic: 
flu/climate change) pre-test, post-test, control group design. “Weak” and “strong” hope-
based messages about climate change, seasonal influenza, and a control message about 
job interviewing were crafted; participants were randomly assigned to read one message. 
Strong hope messages attempted to elicit high levels of all the appraisals identified as 
necessary to evoke hope (goal congruence, possibility, future expectation, and 
importance); the weak hope message attempted to evoke low levels of each appraisal. All 
participants were then presented with action recommendations.  A second phase of data 
collection was collected one week after the post-test.  
 Results yielded from the two topics (flu or climate change) were too statistically 
different to be collapsed for analysis; only the climate change message led to increases in 
each of the hypothesized appraisals. Chadwick’s data revealed that the four appraisals 
accounted for 14% of the variability in subjective feelings of hope for the climate change 
message. That said, her messages were ineffective at generating high levels of hope; 
subjective feelings of hope were below the mean point on a five point scale for both 
message topics. The message topics arguably failed to elicit enough personal importance 
in the individuals. It may be that seasonal influenza and climate change is not personally 
relevant to an undergraduate population.   
 Although these studies use a theoretical framework to develop hope appeal, they 
do not examine whether hope appeals actually lead to increases in positive attitudes or 
behaviors (i.e., persuasiveness).  Moreover, this body of research does not aid in telling 
us why hope appeals might be effective at garnering persuasion, if they are effective at 





regarding message features; these message characteristics are already well established in 
the appraisal theory literature (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Lazarus, 1991). Rather, the 
interest here is in the theoretical underpinnings of the effects of hope appeals as a 
function of how they are cognitively processed. 
Hope Appeal Effects 
 As previously noted, the persuasive effects of hope appeals have not been 
thoroughly examined within empirical research; but, one study provides insight on the 
potential effect of hope appeals. Roseman, Abelson, and Ewing (1986) examined 
emotional appeals used in brochures from social and religious organizations.  These 
brochures were content analyzed and coded for the specific discrete emotion focused on 
in the message.  Although their analysis found that brochures included various emotions 
such as anger and pity, fear and hope dominated the content of the brochures. Moreover, 
hope appeals were most commonly used for organizations focused on reform. Roseman 
et al. asked participants to read each of the brochures and rate (a) the favorability of each 
organization, (b) how much money they would donate to each organization, (c) whether 
they would join the organization if they received an appeal in the mail, and (d) whether 
they would urge their friends to join.  These four questions were employed as alternate 
indicators of an overall “organizational attractiveness” measure that ranged from 0 to 8. 
Their data indicated that, controlling for audience factors, organizations using hope 
appeals were more attractive than were organizations using fear or anger appeals.   
 The data suggest the likeability of hope appeals over fear (or anger) appeals, if 
organizational attractiveness can be considered a proxy for likeability.  Given that this 





attitude change directly, there is limited confidence in the generalization of these 
findings. Although the Roseman et al. (1986) study provides some indications that hope 
appeals might be better received, relative to other emotional appeals (e.g., fear appeals), 
the study does not provide direction in why an audience might prefer the hope appeals.   
There are multiple potential explanations for why individuals may find hope 
appeals more likeable. One explanation is that receivers of hope appeals carefully and 
analytically consider a message, and if they find the arguments compelling, they will 
prefer the message based on these grounds. With regard to the Roseman et al. (1986) 
study in particular, it could that because existing messages from different campaigns 
were used, the hopeful message could have contained higher quality arguments than the 
fear appeal.  An alternative explanation is that receivers of hope appeals become hopeful, 
pay attention to portions of the message they find appealing and goal congruent (ignoring 
other portions), and prefer the message because they processed it in a biased fashion. 
Moreover, efficacy, which was not measured in the Roseman et al. investigation, could 
play a major role in mediating or moderating the effect of the appeal. In order to provide 
such theoretical direction, significant factors influencing cognitive processing of 
persuasive hope appeals must be investigated. These factors, situated within the dual 
processing paradigm and literature on mood and message processing, will be reviewed 
next.   
Dual Processing Models 
 Dual processing models, such as the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM; Petty 
& Cacioppo, 1986) and the Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM; Chaiken, 1980), have 





assume myriad variables outside of message quality can influence information 
processing, attitudes, and message acceptance (Booth-Butterfield & Welbourne, 2002; 
Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Todorov, Chaiken, & Henderson, 
2002). 
 The HSM explains how variables internal and external to a persuasive message 
can influence attitude change (Chaiken, 1980). This dual-processing model posits two 
routes to persuasion: the systematic route is a deeper, closer level of message processing 
in which attention is given to the message and elaboration occurs. Heuristic processing is 
a shallow, more peripheral type of processing that uses peripheral cues and knowledge 
structures (heuristics) to make quicker decisions about the message or stimulus. Chaiken 
(1980) hypothesized that both routes (i.e, heuristic and systematic) of persuasion likely 
occur simultaneously in daily life, but can be dissociated through experimental research. 
This dissociation is evidenced in experimental results showing cognitions about the 
message mediate the relationship between the stimulus and attitude for systematic 
processing; in the case of heuristic processing, message cues influence attitudes directly.  
 Similarly, the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) is an attempt to reconcile 
seemingly contradictory findings about persuasion under one conceptual umbrella, by 
specifying a finite number of roles that message and source variables can have to 
influence attitude change (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). The central route is defined by close 
attention to and elaboration about the message content; the peripheral route is concerned 
with the processing of variables outside message content; for example, the ELM 
generally posits that emotions elicit peripheral processing (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). 





revision over the years (see Stiff, 1986; Stiff & Boster, 1987; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). 
Originally, the two routes to persuasion (central, peripheral) were qualitatively distinct 
and only one was posited to happen at one time; that is, people processed either centrally 
or peripherally (emphasis mine). Early experiments showed the complete dissociation of 
processing (Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981). In responding to critique (Stiff, 1986; 
Stiff & Boster, 1987), Petty, Cacioppo, and their colleagues argued that processing was 
actually on a continuum, with central processing on one end and peripheral processing on 
the other end (Petty, Kasmer, Haugtvedt, & Cacioppo, 1987). Thereafter, discussions of 
the ELM argued that the processing types are not completely distinct (Booth-Butterfield 
& Welbourne, 2002).  
 Both dual processing models hypothesize that attitude change is determined by 
the elaboration of message content (Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). There are 
cognitive and contextual limits on what can be attended to and processed by an individual 
at any given time. The metaphor of message recipients as cognitive misers epitomizes 
how processing choices are made; sufficient levels of both motivation and ability are 
needed for elaboration (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). It is generally agreed that motivation and 
ability determine the nature of processing.  
 Ability. The first major determinant of processing is ability, conceptualized as an 
individual’s capacity to process and comprehend information. Dual processing models 
take environmental factors into account when predicting processing, including the sheer 
overload of persuasive messages received on a daily basis (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). 
There are a variety of factors that can decrease a message recipient’s processing and 





processing ability (Petty, Wells, & Brock, 1976). There are, however, several other 
variables that can influence processing and elaboration ability (Booth-Butterfield & 
Welbourne, 2002): prior knowledge (Averbeck, Jones, & Robertson, 2011); message 
complexity (Hafer, Reynolds, & Obertynski, 1996); time pressure (Kruglanski & Freund, 
1983); and message repetition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1989). If ability is low, message 
recipients will likely not be able to systematically process and will rely instead on 
heuristic cues (Todorov et al., 2002). 
Motivation. It is generally agreed upon that individuals are generally motivated 
to hold accurate attitudes and beliefs (Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; 
Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Booth-Butterfield & Welbourne, 
2002); accuracy motivation presupposes unbiased analysis of information used to form 
attitudes and beliefs. Therefore, when motivation is low, heuristic cues that help 
determine accuracy (e.g., majority opinion is correct) are used to make decisions. When 
accuracy motivation is increased, systematic processing will dominate (Eagly & Chaiken, 
1993). The sufficiency principle assumes that people are cognitive misers, but desire to 
be accurate (Chaiken, 1980; Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Individuals will assess their actual 
confidence in their attitude versus their desired confidence. That is, people are motivated 
to process until they reach the desired level of confidence for the perceived accuracy of 
an attitude. Whereas accuracy motivation is considered the default processing mode, 
there are many factors that can alter the nature of message processing.  
 Personal involvement (i.e., importance) can lead to defensive motivation when 
processing (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Defensive motivation causes individuals to process 





the proposition that personally relevant messages can motivate biased systematic 
processing as a function of individuals’ goals. For their study, students in an 
undergraduate psychology course volunteered to participate in research on health 
concerns. Pre-measures of coffee consumption and beliefs about the risk of caffeine were 
taken at the beginning of the semester. Participants who consumed coffee were matched 
on prior belief measures with participants who abstained. After reporting to the 
laboratory, participants were asked to read two health articles.  The target article included 
the threat manipulation. The high threat condition confirmed the link between caffeine 
consumption and cancer; the low threat message disconfirmed the link. Cognitive 
processing was measured through a self-report of how much effort was used to 
understand the message, recall of the message, perceived veracity of the message, 
thorough assessment of evidence as strong versus weak, and the number of supportive 
versus unsupportive thoughts listed. Results showed that personal relevance significantly 
lowered belief in the veracity of the medical report, regardless of threat level; high-
relevance participants (coffee drinkers; M= 5.60) were less likely than low-relevance 
participants (non-coffee drinkers, M= 6.72) to accept the purported link of caffeine and 
breast cancer, F(1,171) = 27.8, p < .001. Recall did not significantly differ across 
conditions, leading the researchers to believe that defensive inattention was not used by 
participants; rather, participants in the high-relevance condition reported marginally 
higher effort levels to read and understand the article. The authors argued that biased 
systematic processing is more common than inattention, but that these findings may be 
due to the nature of the laboratory setting. Liberman and Chaiken’s (1992) research 





Research outside of the dual processing framework has investigated other types of 
motivation that may simultaneously exist or overpower accuracy motivation (Ditto & 
Lopez, 1992; Das, de Wit, & Stroebe, 2003; de Hoog, Stroebe, & de Wit, 2005; 2008; 
Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Kunda, 1987; 1990; 1999). Highly-involved message recipients 
with vested attitudes often unconsciously prioritize reducing their uncertainty and 
increasing their confidence; this motivation may overpower desires for accuracy (Kunda, 
1990; 1999). Of interest to the current investigation, it has been theorized that feelings of 
hope may overpower accuracy motivation, but there is no empirical research testing this 
assertion (MacInnis & de Mello, 2005). Notably, the idea that moods and emotions can 
influence processing is not new.  
Mood and Processing 
A large body of research has examined the effect of incidental mood (moods not 
relevant to the decision being studied) on persuasion, specifically how happy versus sad 
moods influence persuasion. Extant literature on mood and message processing focuses 
on respondents’ motivation and/or ability to differentiate between weak and strong 
arguments within persuasive messages when in happy or sad moods (e.g., Bless, Bohner, 
Schwarz, & Strack, 1990; Bohner, Chaiken, & Hunyadi, 1994; Bohner, Crow, Erb, & 
Schwarz, 1992; Mitchell, 2000; Petty, Schumann, Richman, & Strathman, 1993; 
Schwarz, 1990; Wegener, Petty, & Smith, 1995). The ELM posits that negative affect 
(generally operationalized as sadness) causes central processing, while positive affect 
(generally operationalized as happiness) causes heuristic processing to dominate (Bless, 
Schwarz, Clore, Golisano, Rabe, & Wölk, 1996). A major underlying explanation for 





The Hedonic Contingency Hypothesis posits that happy people generally avoid careful 
processing of messages because they may be hedonically punishing (Wegener, Petty, & 
Smith, 1995); therefore, the assessment of hedonic consequences (i.e. whether the 
message is positive or negative) is more likely for happy than for sad people. That said, 
happy people are more likely to process a message systematically if it is positively 
valenced than if it is negatively valenced.  Sad people will process a message regardless 
of hedonic consequences in an attempt to improve their mood (Negative State Relief 
Model; Cialdini, Darby, & Vincent, 1973) because people in a sad mood “have nowhere 
to go but to the positive end of the mood continuum” (Hullett, 2005, p. 427).  
 Overall, this body of research demonstrates that “all things being equal, people 
will prefer to think and behave in ways that prolong positive affective states and improve 
negative ones” (Forgas, 2003, p. 609). But new research complicates this maxim. 
Griskevicius, Shiota, and Neufeld (2010) focused in on the effects of irrelevant, positive 
discrete emotions on persuasive message processing. The researchers were specifically 
interested in whether discrete positive emotions were processed similarly and if 
processing was mediated by the same predictors in all cases. Six positive emotions were 
identified for study: attachment love, nurturing love, anticipated amusement, anticipated 
enthusiasm, contentment, and awe. In the first study, participants were randomly assigned 
to write about a life experience that elicited the targeted emotion. Participants were then 
randomly assigned to read either strong or weak arguments about instituting 
comprehensive exams as a graduation requirement (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  Results 
showed that anticipatory amusement, enthusiasm, and attachment love facilitated 





systematic processing. That is, attitude toward the message advocating for comprehensive 
exams was a function of argument strength for awe and nurturing love, but not for the 
other emotions. The authors hypothesized that emotions like amusement and enthusiasm 
are similar to happiness, the most commonly used affect induction in mood and 
processing studies. Awe and nurturing love, although classified as positive emotions, are 
noticeably different in appraisal tendencies and core relational themes. It therefore makes 
logical sense that these emotions would elicit differences in message processing. Study 2 
examined nurturing love, awe, anticipatory enthusiasm, and amusement. Emotion 
induction was accomplished via narratives piloted to elicit a significant amount of the 
targeted emotion.  Participants were randomly assigned to read a strong or weak 
argument about instituting a normal grading curve (Tiedens & Linton, 2001). Cognitive 
appraisals of certainty and responsibility were measured along with a thought-listing task. 
The results of study 1 were replicated, in that nurturing love and awe elicited systematic 
processing and anticipated enthusiasm and amusement elicited heuristic processing. 
Appraisals of uncertainty and responsibility were tested as potential mediators of the 
relationship between emotion and persuasion. Both responsibility and uncertainty 
appraisals were identified as significant mediators, but not in a consistent pattern across 
emotions. Overall, higher levels of certainty were associated with heuristic processing.  
The authors argued that these results support the need to examine positive emotions as 
discrete entities with differential outcomes. These results complicate the notion that 
positive affect elicits heuristic processing. Moreover, hope is similar to awe in appraisals 
of uncertainty and lowered situational control. Therefore, hope appeal recipients may be 





The literature on mood maintenance would lead to the hypothesis that hopeful 
participants will not be motivated to process in an attempt to maintain their positive 
feelings (Wegener & Petty, 1994; Wegener, Petty & Smith, 1995). Griskevicius et al. 
(2010) would argue that because uncertainty appraisals are central to hope, these appeals 
are more likely to elicit systematic processing. That said, the body of research generally 
only addresses whether an individual will systematically or heuristically process while 
feeling a message-irrelevant emotion and assuming accuracy motivation. As previously 
discussed, messages that elicit strong appraisals of importance and provide goal-related 
information (characteristics of hope appeals) are known to cause biased processing 
(Kunda, 1999). The ways in which biased processing can change the nature of systematic 
and heuristic processing is considered next.   
Biased Processing and Hope  
 In this dissertation, it has been established that hope can be an attribute of 
persuasive messages, i.e., the combination of hope appraisals featured in the message.  I 
have also provided evidence that these appraisal patterns lead to feelings of hope and that 
feelings of hope create motivation in people, ultimately affecting the type of message 
processing in which they engage.  Likewise, fear also creates motivation, albeit a 
different kind of motivation, that is causally antecedent to message processing.  That is, it 
is predicted that hope appeals and fear appeals are persuasive, but the nature of cognitive 
processing differs.  I argue that fearful and hopeful message processors are equally 
biased, but the kinds of processing that manifests in hopeful relative to fearful message 





processing strategies expected when people receive goal-congruent (hope appeals) and 
goal-incongruent (fear appeals) information.  
 Biased processing can occur when personal involvement overpowers individuals’ 
motivation to process information accurately (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). When motivated 
by accuracy, people will continue to process information until they are confident that they 
hold a correct opinion or can make the best decision (Kruglanski, 1980; Kunda, 1990; 
1999); conversely, biased processing occurs when “one has a preexisting goal and 
engages in a highly selective search for information to support that objective” (Nabi, 
1999, p. 303).  Therefore, when individuals have vested interest in their current attitudes 
and beliefs, they may process information in a way that allows for those beliefs and 
attitudes to be maintained (Kunda, 1999). Simply the presence of goal-incongruent 
information about a highly relevant topic is believed to induce biased processing (Kunda, 
1990; Liberman & Chaiken, 1992: Petty & Cacioppo, 1979). Biased processing can occur 
through systematic, close processing or through the use of heuristics that aid in the 
maintenance of the preferred belief (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Petty 
& Cacioppo, 1979; 1986; see Kunda, 1999 for a full discussion of biased processing).  
 Kunda’s (1987) work on biased processing shows that even when individuals are 
presented with objective evidence, people still engage in biased processing in a self-
serving manner (i.e., toward achieving their own personal goals). Kunda first examined 
this bias in the context of projecting marital success. Participants (college students) were 
informed that the divorce rate in America was 50 percent and told they were participating 
in a study on the role of personality characteristics in the success of marriage. 





graduated from the same university in the 1960s. They were also told whether the person 
was still married or was divorced, and then asked to judge the personality characteristics 
that would be more beneficial to possess for a successful long-term relationship. Later, 
they were asked to list their personality traits and rate how helpful these traits would be 
for a successful marriage.   
 Results demonstrated evidence of biased judgments. First, when asked to estimate 
the chance they would divorce,the average estimation was 20 percent—despite the fact 
they were explicitly told that the average divorce rate was 50 percent.  Participants also 
predicted that the hypothetical character, whose personality traits mirrored their own 
traits, had a greater chance of successful marriage relative to the actual probabilistic rate. 
For example, participants who were not religious thought that atheism would help the 
non-religious character have a successful relationship; those who were deeply religious 
reported that devoutness would enhance the hypothetical character’s ability to have a 
successful marriage.  
 This biasing effect did not occur when involvement was low, however. When 
asking students who were not interested in attending law or medical school the attributes 
needed to be successful in those ventures, students were more objective in judging the 
needed characteristics and less inclined to believe that their own traits would be helpful in 
getting into a professional school. In two more experiments, Kunda (1987) demonstrated 
that when perceived threat to self is high, individuals will downplay the veracity of 
evidence (notably, this is consistent with Witte’s [1992] notion of defensive processing 
found in people experiencing high fear and little efficacy); when the threat is lessened, 





read an article arguing that high caffeine consumption leads to increased risk of breast 
cancer for women.  The results indicated that participants who self-reported caffeine 
consumption did perceive being at a higher risk for developing the disease; they were 
also more likely to doubt the veracity of the information in the article. Men did not differ 
in their judgments of the risk to women or the veracity of the article, arguably because 
men were less invested in the issue. The fourth study showed that when the threat was 
lowered to simply developing benign lumps in the breast because of caffeine 
consumption, the caffeinated women were less likely to doubt the veracity of the article. 
Overall, these studies demonstrated that people are likely to maintain optimistic beliefs 
about their future in the face of disconfirming information.  Moreover, this tendency can 
be explained by biased cognitive processing, operationalized as the prospective 
judgments made by study participants. Kunda (1999) called for an investigation of the 
underlying mechanisms that can cause biased processing.  This dissertation aims to 
answer this call through examining the potential biasing effects of hope appeals.  
 Overall, there is limited empirical research examining how discrete emotions 
could elicit biased message processing.  Historically, communication that arouses 
negative affect has been thought to cause biased processing (Janis & Feshbach, 1953; 
Janis, 1967); a majority of this research is focused upon fear and persuasion (Nabi, 1999). 
There is some research that examines how fear appeals influence message processing. 
Gleicher and Petty (1992) examined the effect of relevant and irrelevant fear on the 
processing of message recommendations. Moderate levels of fear were expected to 
motivate message recipients to attain reassurance that a threat could be overcome. When 





process the rest of the message, lest they lose reassurance.  These participants were not 
influenced by the quality of the arguments made in the message. When reassurance was 
uncertain, message recipients carefully processed the message. Their perception of the 
message was determined by the quality of the arguments presented.  Gleicher and Petty 
noted that message reassurance is a fuzzy concept that cannot be limited to manipulation 
of an article’s headline; source expertise and argument strength could elicit perceptions of 
message quality, which would in itself be reassurance to a fearful reader.  
These findings can be used to infer that a hope-based message would provide its 
readers with reassurance in the form of hedonic, goal-congruent information. Therefore, 
participants who receive a hope appeal in this study may not be motivated to process the 
recommendations closely. Conversely, participants receiving a fear appeal should be 
highly motivated to process recommendations in search of reassurance.      
 More recent investigations have focused on how fear appeals can bias processing 
of health recommendations (Das et al., 2003; de Hoog et al., 2005; 2008). Importantly, 
Das et al. (2003) separated the emotional appeal from message recommendations to be 
able to examine the effects of the appeal on processing of the recommendations in their 
research. Overall, this work has shown that when people feel fearful (i.e., threatened) and 
vulnerable, they will rate recommendations associated with overcoming threats more 
positively than those who do not feel vulnerable, regardless of the recommendations’ 
argument quality. Moreover, it was demonstrated that source credibility manipulations 
had no significant effect on attitudes toward the recommendations. That is, these results 
show that fearful people engaged in motivated processing of goal congruent information, 





recommendations.  This body of research provides interesting predictions for the effects 
of hope and fear appeals on message processing.   
 Because high involvement (i.e., relevance) is a necessary precondition for hope 
and fear, and given that involvement leads to a desire to process in a self-preserving 
manner, then  people who receive a goal-incongruent message (in the study, a fear 
appeal) will be more likely to doubt the veracity of the information and/or ignore the 
message altogether.  Similarly, people receiving a goal congruent message (in this study, 
a hope appeal) will be less likely to doubt the veracity of the message; the differential 
effects of processing are due to the presence of goal congruent or incongruent 
information. Conversely, fear appeal recipients would pay close attention to and be more 
persuaded by message recommendations than hope appeal recipients.  
It has been established that the desire for goal-congruent information likely causes 
bias in message processing: specifically, individuals are motivated to maintain a belief in 
their ability to attain their desired goals (Kunda, 1987; Liberman & Chaiken, 1992).  
Thus, I predict that goal-incongruent appeals, in this case fear appeals, and goal 
congruent appeals, in this case hope appeals, will both cause biased processing—albeit 
different types of biases. Although biased processing can manifest in a variety of ways, in 
this dissertation I focus on four particular forms: relevant versus irrelevant thoughts, 
supportive thoughts, perceptual defense in the form of counterarguing, and memory 
recognition. 
Bias 1:  Thought-Listing. Significant differences in the amount and type of 
thoughts listed about the emotional appeal is expected when comparing those receiving a 





emotional appeal conditions and the rational appeal are expected to emerge. Past research 
has demonstrated that those in pleasant mood and emotional states are expected to 
generate more irrelevant thoughts than those in negative mood states (Seibert & Ellis, 
1991). Literature also suggests people do not argue goal-congruent information; it is 
therefore predicted that individuals receiving hope appeals will be less likely to 
counterargue the message and associated recommendations (i.e., doubt the veracity) and 
be more likely to have message-supportive thoughts about the appeal and 
recommendations—regardless of the actual argument quality or source quality (Das et al., 
2003; de Hoog et al., 2008). Those induced to feel fear will be motivated to find 
information to reduce uncertainty about the threat; they will therefore process in a biased, 
systematic way to seek reassurance (Gleicher & Petty, 1992). Fearful people will be more 
likely to counterargue the goal-incongruent information of the fear appeal, while 
generating message-supportive thoughts about the recommendations they receive to help 
address the threat. Moreover, fearful participants are then likely to generate message-
supportive thoughts about the recommendations and source, regardless of their quality 
(de Hoog et al., 2008). The overall type of these thoughts—whether they reflect the 
emotion communicated in the message specifically—will also be investigated.  
Bias 2:  Recall. Nabi (1999) argued that if emotional appeals elicit motivated 
attention and processing, their effects would be evidenced through disparate recall. That 
is, information relevant to the felt emotion and the emotion’s goals would be recalled 
more than other types of information. Previous research has documented that emotions 





1986; Newhagen, 1998; Newhagen & Reeves, 1992), and that type of recall can vary by 
emotion (Mitchell, Brown, Morris-Villigran, & Villigran, 2001).   
The biased motivations of hopeful and fearful individuals are also predicted to 
manifest in the recall measures. Specifically, this study will examine memory 
recognition, a recall measure commonly used in communication research (Mitchell, 2000; 
Skalski, Tamborini, Glazer, & Smith, 2009).  There are three types of memory 
recognition examined in this study: hits, misses, and false alarms. Here, a “hit” reveals 
accuracy; a participant recognizes a statement as being in the message that was indeed in 
the message.  A “miss” reveals non-accuracy; a participant fails to recognize a statement 
when it was in the message.  Finally, a “false alarm” is a measure of non-accuracy and 
specifically of a self-serving bias.  Here, a participant recalls a message as being in the 
appeal when it was not.  
The biased motivations of hopeful and fearful individuals are also predicted to 
manifest in the recall measures. Individuals receiving a hope appeal are expected to 
accurately recall less than those receiving a fear appeal. But the nature of this recall is not 
known. When asked to recall the recommendations, hope appeal recipients could 
generate a significant number of misses. Fear appeal recipients are expected to more 
accurately recall recommendations because they processed them closely seeking 
reassurance. But, because of their desire for reassurance, they are posited to have not 
scrutinized the recommendations, and may have a significant number of false alarms, 
such that they will overestimate the amount of recommendations presented. The next 






Chapter 3: Hypotheses and Research Questions 
 Ditto and Lopez (1992) wrote that “the intuition that hopes, wishes, 
apprehensions, and fears affect judgments is compelling and persistent. Turning this 
intuition into viable empirical and theoretical data, however, has proved one of the most 
recalcitrant problems in the history of experimental research” (p. 568). The lack of 
attention to hope within social scientific research has created a significant knowledge 
void for those seeking to understand its persuasive power. The dearth of knowledge 
presents justification for a thorough, empirical investigation of the effects of hope appeals 
on cognitive processing.   
 To review, an individual’s hopefulness about achieving a desired outcome is 
determined by appraisal of her environment. People encounter a variety of goal-
congruent and goal-incongruent messages about their goals on a daily basis. Messages 
like hope appeals lower uncertainty; conversely, fear appeals attempt to increase 
uncertainty via severity and susceptibility (Witte, 1992). To maintain hope, individuals 
may downgrade the importance of accuracy and engage in biased processing. The nature 
of this biased processing depends on the type of information encountered. Individuals 
who encounter a hope appeal have little motivation to challenge the veracity of the 
message content, or scrutinize accompanying recommendations and their source. 
Moreover, past research has demonstrated that those in pleasant moods and emotional 
states are expected to generate more irrelevant thoughts than those in negative mood 
states, indicating lack of motivation to process closely (Seibert & Ellis, 1991). 
Thus, I predict that goal-incongruent appeals, in this case fear appeals, and goal 





different types of biases. It is predicted that these varied types of biased processing can be 
demonstrated through thought listing and recall of the recommendations and their source.  
H1: Hope appeal recipients will generate fewer relevant thoughts and more 
irrelevant thoughts about the emotional appeal than fear appeal recipients.  
H2: Hope appeal recipients will generate more supportive thoughts and fewer 
counterarguments about the emotional appeal than fear appeal recipients. 
RQ1: Will the amount of emotional thoughts generated vary as a function of the 
appeal? 
RQ2: Will a “match” between appeal and type of emotional thoughts generated 
(hopeful or fearful) emerge? Or will fear appeal recipients generate more hopeful 
thoughts?    
Regarding the theoretical rationale for difference in cognitive processing of 
recommendations as a function of receiving a hope or fear appeal.  
Individuals encountering a fear appeal will be highly motivated to process 
associated recommendations in a systematic, biased manner (Das et al., 2003; de Hoog et 
al., 2005; de Hoog et al., 2008). They will likely not counterargue a goal-congruent 
message (in this case, any type of recommendations) or doubt its veracity. They would be 
more willing to accept recommendations that accompany the message because of the 
increased efficacy the advice will give them to overcome the potential threat. They are 
also less likely to scrutinize the veracity of recommendations or the source that provides 
them.  
H3: Hope appeal recipients will generate fewer supportive thoughts about the 





recommendation quality. Hope and fear appeal recipients will not differ in their 
counterargument output.  
When deriving a theory of emotional appeal processing, it is necessary and important to 
also consider the effect of recommendation quality. The influence of argument strength 
on processing is a central element of the dual-processing paradigm (Chaiken, 1980; Petty 
& Cacioppo, 1986). Moreover, the importance of argument strength on persuasion should 
not be underestimated; therefore, this dissertation examines if the type of emotional 
appeal received interacts with argument quality to influence processing outcomes. That 
said, emotional appeal recipients are hypothesized to process in a biased manner and not 
be sensitive to recommendation quality manipulations:  
H4: Emotional appeal type (fear, hope, rational) and recommendation quality 
will interact to affect generation of supportive thoughts about the 
recommendation. There will be an effect of recommendation quality on recipients 
of the rational appeal, such that high quality recommendations and source 
recipients will generate more supportive thoughts than low quality 
recommendations and source recipients; there will be no effect for 
recommendation quality for receivers of a hope or fear appeal.  
RQ3: Will the number of relevant or irrelevant thoughts vary as a function of 
emotional appeal type and recommendation quality?  
RQ4: Will the amount of emotional thoughts about the recommendations 






RQ5: Will the amount of different types of emotional thoughts generated vary as a 
function of emotional appeal type and recommendation quality?   
Recall of recommendations. The biased motivations of hopeful and fearful 
individuals may also manifest in the recall measures. If hope appeal recipients do not pay 
attention to the recommendations, they would be expected to accurately recall fewer 
recommendations than those receiving a fear appeal. Fear appeal recipients may 
accurately recall recommendations because they processed them seeking reassurance. 
But, it is not clear that fear appeal recipients closely processed recommendations. 
Because of their desire for reassurance, they are posited to have not scrutinized the 
recommendations, and may have a significant number of false alarms such that they will 
overestimate the amount of recommendations presented. Due to the tentative nature of 
these conjectures, research questions about recall are proffered.  
RQ6: Will total number of hits, misses, and false alarms vary as a function of 
emotional appeal type?  
RQ7: Will emotional appeal type and recommendation quality interact to 







   Chapter 4: Method 
 The fourth chapter of this dissertation details the data collection and methods used 
to collect three pilot studies and a main experiment. Participants, study design, 
procedures, and instrumentation, and analysis for the pilot tests are included. All data 
collection for this dissertation was approved by the University of Maryland Institutional 
Review Board. All three pilot tests and the main experiment were conducted online via 
Survey Monkey (SurveyMonkey, 2012).  
Pilot Study 1:  Determination of Topic   
 The purpose of the first pilot study was to determine the persuasive topic for the 
main experiment.  First, interviews were conducted with 5 members of the target 
population.  Students were asked to write paragraphs about their feelings toward their 
financial future and answer a series of open-ended questions about their financial 
attitudes, perceptions, and behavioral intentions. Thematic analysis revealed that all 5 
students cared deeply about their financial future, wished they received more information 
about how to manage finances, and felt fearful and hopeful about their prospects. There 
was unanimous agreement that messages about students’ financial futures would elicit 
interest from the target population.  
 Next, an empirical cross-sectional survey study of beliefs, perceptions, and 
attitudes of the target population toward financial security was conducted. Participants 
were asked to provide demographic information, level of fear about their future financial 
situation, level of hope about their future financial situation, orientation toward life 





of thinking about personal finances, the importance of personal finances, and uncertainty 
related to personal finances.   
Participants 
 One hundred students from a large Mid-Atlantic University in the United States 
participated in this study. Students were offered course credit in exchange for 
participation. The mean age was approximately 20 years (SD = 1.76). Thirty-two percent 
of the participants were males (N = 32) and 68% were female (N = 68). Participants were 
encouraged to indicate all racial and / or ethnic backgrounds.  The sample identified 63% 
Non-Hispanic white (N = 63), 14% African American (N = 14), 4% Hispanic or Latino 
(N = 4), 17% Asian or Asian American (N = 17), and 2% American Indian or Alaska 
Native (N= 2). The remaining 2% of the sample identified themselves as being of another 
race (N = 2). The participants included 15% freshman (N = 15), 39% sophomores (N = 
39), 20% juniors (N = 20), 24% seniors (N = 24). Two percent did not identify their year 
in college.   
Procedures 
 Upon starting the study via Survey Monkey, participants were first presented with 
a consent form.  Upon providing consent, the survey continued with questions pertaining 
to demographics, life orientation, efficacy levels for different financial behaviors, hope 
about their financial situation, fear about their financial situation, and appraisals of 
importance, pleasantness, and uncertainty about the topic of personal financial security.  








 Confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) were conducted on the existing and modified 
scales using LISREL 8.80 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2006). It is important to conduct CFAs 
on scales, even if they have been used in previous published research (Levine, Hullett, 
Turner, & Lapinski, 2006). Therefore, CFAs were conducted on all scales in each pilot 
and the main study. Fit statistics for each scale are reported below, and provide different 
types of understanding about how well different items combine within a scale. There is 
little agreement about which fit indices should be used (Maruyama, 1998); rather experts 
suggest going across the spectrum of options and choosing a fit index from different 
classes (Kline, 1998). The first class is absolute—these indexes focus in on residual 
variance. The second class of fit indices takes a relative approach with pitting the model 
against other possible models within the same data set. The third and final type of index 
is adjusted, which takes both fit and parsimony into account.  The Root Mean Square 
Error of Approximation (RMSEA), Standardized Root Mean Residual (SRMR), and 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) were used as fit indices within this dissertation. RMSEA is 
in the parsimonious index class, SRMR is in the absolute index class, and CFI is in the 
incremental index class.  Guidelines advise that satisfactory fit values be used for the 
scales: RMSEA ≤ .06, SRMR ≤ .08, and for CFI ≥ .95 (Hu & Bentler, 1999).  
 Life orientation test (LOT). Respondents’ orientation to life (optimism vs. 
pessimism) was assessed using the Life Orientation Test (LOT). The scale developed by 
Scheier and Carver (1985) is used to control for individual differences in optimistic 
versus pessimistic personality characteristics. Scheier and Carver (1985) found that these 





LOT was measured using a 6-item, 7-point Likert scale ranging from “1” (strongly 
disagree) to “7” (strongly agree). Questions included “If something can go wrong for me, 
it will,” and “I always look on the bright side of things.” The scale was reliable (M = 
4.80, SD = 1.11, α = .84). Confirmatory factor analysis reveled that all items loaded on 
one factor with marginal fit (RMSEA= .23, SRMR= .081, CFI= .89).  
Importance. Appraisals of importance were measured with 7 items that tapped 
the perceived relevance of financial security after graduation to the student respondents.  
Participants indicated their agreement with a series of statements on a 7-point Likert scale 
ranging from “1” (strongly disagree) to “7” (strongly agree). Items included “Establishing 
financial security after finishing school is very relevant to me,” and “I really want 
financial security after finishing school.” The scale was reliable (M = 6.35, SD = .96, α = 
.91). Confirmatory factor analysis demonstrated that all the items loaded on one variable 
with marginal fit (RMSEA= .15, SRMR= .019, CFI= .97).  
 Uncertainty. Appraisals of uncertainty were measured with 4 items that tapped 
perceptions that students would be able to attain financial security after graduation. 
Participants indicated their agreement with a series of statements on a 7-point Likert scale 
ranging from “1” (strongly uncertain) to “7” (strongly uncertain). Items included “I 
believe I can establish my financial security after finishing school,” and “Financial 
security after finishing school will happen for me.”  The scale was reliable (M = 5.37, SD 
= 1.36, α = .89). Confirmatory factor analysis demonstrated that all factors loaded on one 
dimension with satisfactory fit (RMSEA= .07, SRMR= .021, CFI= 1.00) 
 Pleasantness. Appraisals of pleasantness were measured with 4 items that tapped 





agreement with a series of statements on 5-point Likert scales ranging from “1” (strongly 
disagree) to “5” (strongly agree). Items included “I like to think about my financial 
situation,” and “Thinking about my finances is pleasant.”  The scale was reliable (M = 
2.68, SD = .85, α = .86). Confirmatory factor analysis demonstrated that all items loaded 
on a single factor with satisfactory fit (RMSEA= .022, SRMR= .020, CFI= .99)  
 Hope about finances. Hope about finances was measured using 4 items to assess 
how hopeful students feel about their future financial prospects. Participants indicated 
their agreement with a series of statements on 5-point Likert scales ranging from “1” 
(strongly disagree) to “5” (strongly agree). Items included: “Thinking about my finances 
makes me feel positive,” and “When I think about my finances, I feel optimistic.”  The 
scale was reliable (M = 3.11, SD = .71, α = .84). Confirmatory factor analysis revealed 
that all of the scale’s items loaded on one factor with marginal fit (RMSEA=.25, SRMR= 
.11, CFI= .88).  
 Fear about finances. Fear about finances was measured using 3 items to assess 
how fearful students feel about their future financial prospects.  Participants indicated 
their agreement with a series of statements on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “1” 
(strongly disagree) to “5” (strongly agree). Items included “Thinking about my finances 
makes me feel fearful,” and “Thinking about my finances makes me feel anxious.”  The 
scale was reliable (M = 3.10, SD = .89, α = .834). Confirmatory factor analysis revealed 
that model was saturated and could not compute valid fit indices; more items were added 
to the fear measure for the remaining pilots and main study.  
 Perceived efficacy for financial behavior.  No known scales are available to 





examine efficacy, domain-specific scales should be located or created if needed. 
Therefore, a scale to measure perceived efficacy to accomplish a variety of financial 
behaviors was crafted. First, twenty common financial behaviors were identified (Xiao, 
2008). Participants were asked to gauge their efficacy through responses to 5-point Likert 
scales ranging from “1” (absolutely no confidence) to “5” (completely confident). Items 
were prefaced with “Please rate your confidence in being able to accomplish each of the 
following items” and included examples like “create a realistic personal budget,” 
“manage a credit card,” and “not need to borrow money” (see Table 2 for complete list of 
20 items).  
 Examining the correlation matrix for these 20 items, no items were correlated 
above .80, (which would potentially present multicolinearity issues). The variables were 
moderately correlated, which arguably infers that shared variance between them would 
yield fewer factors than items (Pett, Lackey, & Sullivan, 2003). The 20 items were 
submitted to exploratory factor analysis. Principle axis factoring (PAF) was used to 
discern the number of factors and the item loadings (Kim & Mueller, 1978). PAF is a 
common exploratory method for identifying and computing composites (Pett et al., 
2003). Assumptions of the PAF were first examined. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure is 
an index for examining the magnitude of observed correlation coefficients relative to 
partial correlation coefficients; larger values suggest that factor analysis is appropriate. 
The KMO value equaled .873, indicating factor analysis on these items was appropriate. 
Next, Bartlett’s test of sphercity was examined. Barrett’s test examines the hypothesis 
that the variables included in the test are uncorrelated. Results from the PAF 





.001). These tests of the assumptions of PAF increase confidence that these items are 
appropriate for factor analysis.  
 Initial eigenvalues revealed that the first factor accounted for almost 42% of the 
variance, the second factor accounted for 8.31% of the variance, the third factor account 
for a 4.77% of the variance, and the fourth factor accounted for less than 4% of the 
variance. Two, three and four factor solutions were examined, using varimax rotations of 
the loading matrix. Varimax was used because it potentially fixes colinearity problems by 
making the composites orthogonal (Pett et al., 2003). The three factor solution, which 
explained about 60% of the variance, was selected because the three factors were 
interpretable and the scree plot leveled after the third factor. After the third factor, there 
were an insufficient amount of loadings to make additional factor interpretable. The first 
factor included 12 items that could be classified as “efficacy for establishing financial 
security” that formed a reliable scale (M= 2.62, SD= .835, α= .920). The second factor 
included 5 items that could be classified as “budgeting for financial security” that formed 
a reliable scale (M= 3.32, SD= .845, α= .85).  The third factor included 3 items that could 
be classified as “able to accurately manage finances;” it formed a reliable scale (M= 3.15, 
SD= .91, α= .71). The three scales were summed to create an overall measure of financial 
efficacy.  See Table 2 for a list of all 20 items and their associated factor loadings. 
Results  
 Overall, students reported that their financial security is very important to them 
(M = 6.35, SD = .96), and somewhat unpleasant to think about (M = 2.68, SD = .85). 
They reported being optimistic (M = 4.80, SD = 1.11) and moderately efficacious (M= 





Participants reported feeling similar levels of hope (M = 3.11, SD = .71) and fear (M = 
3.10, SD = .89) about their financial future, with high levels of certainty (M = 5.37, SD = 
1.36) that everything will work out for them financially after graduation. This brief 
snapshot helped the author to better understand the target population and design tailored 
hope, fear, and rational appeals about their financial security after graduation. The pilot 
testing of these appeals is discussed next. 
Pilot Study 2:  Emotional Appeals Pilot   
 Overview. The purpose of this pilot study was to test that the messages elicited 
the theorized appraisals and the target emotion.  This pilot also assessed the persuasive 
equality across the message variations.  Based on pilot one data, messages were crafted 
around the topic of financial security. The importance of college students actively 
engaging with their personal finances was selected as the main focus for the messages.  
The bleak economy has made smart financial decision making by young adults 
imperative for their financial security (Bonner, 2011; Chang, 2011). The hope and fear 
appeals focused on the need to start thinking about personal finances before graduation 
(see Appendix B for all messages). The rational appeal was based upon a website entry 
about personal finance. Specifically, the entry focused on explaining how personal credit 
scores are calculated, their importance, and how they can be located. The hope appeal 
focused on the possibility of students overcoming current economic obstacles to obtain 
financial security. The fear appeal focused on it likely being an impossible task to 
overcome current economic obstacles to obtain financial security. Each appeal was tested 
to ensure it elicited a significant amount of the targeted emotion and a non-significant 





elicited a significant amount of fear. Changes to the hope appeal and rational appeal were 
made, and all the messages were tested again. The results of the second message pilot are 
reported below.   
Participants  
 One hundred fifty-three students from a large Mid-Atlantic University in the 
United States participated in this pilot study. The mean age was approximately 20 (SD = 
2.54). Thirty-five percent of the participants were males (N = 54) and 64% were female 
(N = 98). One person did not identify as male or female. Participants were asked to 
indicate all races that applied to them. Sixty-four percent identified as Non-Hispanic 
White (N = 97), 19% identified as Black or African American (N = 29), 12% identified 
as Asian or Asian America (N = 18), 6% as Hispanic or Latino (N = 9), 2% as Pacific 
Islander (N= 3), and 3% as American Indian (N=4). Less than one percent of participants 
in the sample identified as being other races (N = 2). The participants included 12% 
freshman (N = 18), 33% sophomores (N = 51), 28% juniors (N = 43), and 25% seniors (N 
= 38). Two respondents did not indicate their year in school. At the end of the study, 
students were asked to estimate their household income for 2010. Sixteen percent of the 
students estimated their household’s income to be below $60,000 (N=24), 21% estimated 
their household income above $60,000 but below $100,000 (N= 32), 18% estimated their 
household income between $100,000 but below $150,000 (N=28), 18% estimated their 
household income to be above $150,000 but below $200,000 (N= 27), 11% estimated 
their household income above $200,000 but below $250,000 (N= 17), and 14% estimated 
that their household income was over $250,000 (N=22). Three respondents opted to not 





Procedures   
 After providing informed consent, participants were told they would be reading 
and responding to a message about personal finances. They were then randomly assigned 
to receive a hope, fear, or rational appeal. All the appeals were the same length exactly 
(278 words), and the readability was within a grade level (10th), below the average 
reading level for the target audience of college students (see Appendix A for messages). 
After reading one of the three messages, participants responded to a series of questions 
about the emotions elicited from the message, appraisals of importance, pleasantness, 
goal congruence, perceived persuasiveness of the appeal, and their certainty about 
attaining financial security. Finally, they were asked to provide an estimation of their 
household income and thanked for their time.  
Instrumentation  
 Confirmatory factor analyses were conducted on each scale using LISREL 8.80 
(Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2006). Fit statistics for each scale are reported below. The Root 
Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), Standardized Root Mean Residual 
(SRMR), and Comparative Fit Index (CFI) were used as fit indices. RMSEA is in the 
parsimonious index class, SRMR is in the absolute index class, and CFI is in the 
incremental index class.   
 Felt hope. Perceived felt hope was measured with four items that asked 
participants to respond to statements about how the message made them feel (hopeful, 
positive, optimistic, and encouraged). Participants indicated their agreement with the 
statement on 5-point scale (strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, and strongly 





affirmed that all items loaded on one factor with satisfactory fit (RMSEA= .00, SRMR= 
.0068, CFI= 1.00).  
 Felt fear. Perceived felt fear was measured with four items that asked participants 
to respond to statements about how the message made them feel (anxious, scared, 
frightened, and alarmed). Participants indicated their agreement with the statement on 5-
point scale (strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, and strongly agree). The scale was 
reliable (M= 3.77, SD= 1.23, α= .82). Confirmatory factor analysis affirmed that all items 
loaded on one factor with satisfactory fit (RMSEA= .20, SRMR= .056, CFI= .95).  
 Goal congruence. Perceived goal congruence was measured with five items that 
asked participants to respond to questions about what the message communicated (made 
financial security: seem more possible, consistent with goals, increased likelihood of goal 
of financial security, contained information that leads to belief goal is possible, was 
consistent with ideals). Participants indicated their agreement to the statements on 7-point 
scales (strongly disagree, moderately disagree, slightly disagree, neutral, slightly agree, 
moderately agree, and strongly agree). The scale was reliable (M= 4.11, SD= 1.16, α= 
.91). Confirmatory factor analysis affirmed that all items loaded on one factor (RMSEA= 
.31, SRMR= .074, CFI=.90).  
 Pleasantness. Perceived pleasantness was measured with six items that asked 
participants to indicate their response to reading the message (the message was: 
enjoyable, pleasant to read, contained positive information, was unpleasant to read [rc], 
was negatively toned [rc], was troubling [rc]). Participants indicated their agreement to 
the statements on 7-point scales (strongly disagree, moderately disagree, slightly 





reliable (M= 4.06, SD= 1.17, α= .89). Confirmatory factor analysis affirmed that all items 
loaded on one factor (RMSEA= .23, SRMR= .086, CFI= .90).  
 Importance. Perceived importance was measured with six items that asked 
respondents about the importance of financial security to them (really want, very relevant 
to me, very important, very satisfying, doesn’t matter [rc]). Participants were asked to 
indicate their agreement to the statement on a 7-point scale (strongly disagree, 
moderately disagree, slightly disagree, neutral, slightly agree, moderately agree, and 
strongly agree). The scale was reliable (M= 6.20, SD= 1.12, α= .91). Confirmatory factor 
analysis affirmed that all items loaded on one factor with satisfactory fit (RMSEA= .15, 
SRMR= .019, CFI= .97).  
 Uncertainty. Perceived uncertainty was measured with four items that asked 
respondents how they felt about their financial prospects after reading the message. 
Participants were asked how the message influenced their perceptions about the 
possibility of financial success, belief in achieving personal financial goals, possibility of 
achieving financial goals, and overall likelihood of attainment. Participants were asked to 
indicate their agreement to the statements on a 7-point scale (strongly disagree, 
moderately disagree, slightly disagree, neutral, slightly agree, moderately agree, and 
strongly agree).The scale was reliable (M= 4.28, SD= 1.24, α= .91). Confirmatory factor 
analysis affirmed that all items loaded on one factor with satisfactory fit (RMSEA= .085, 
SRMR= .0068, CFI= 1.00).  
 Perceived persuasiveness. Perceived persuasiveness of each appeal was 
measured with 6 items that asked participants to judge message persuasiveness (the 





Participants were asked to indicate their agreement to the statement on a 7-point scale 
(strongly disagree, moderately disagree, slightly disagree, neutral, slightly agree, 
moderately agree, and strongly agree). The scale was reliable (M= 4.81, SD= .85, α= .79). 
Confirmatory factor analysis affirmed that all items loaded on one factor with marginal 
fit (RMSEA= .25, SRMR= .11, CFI= .79). 
Results 
 Means and standard deviations for each dependent variable as a function of appeal 
can also be found in Table 3. First, an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was performed on 
the participants’ reported emotional response to the message they read. Participants who 
received a hope appeal judged the message as more hopeful (M=4.40, SD= 1.34) than 
those who received the fear appeal (M= 2.86, SD= 1.20) or rational appeal (M= 3.60, SD= 
1.06; F[2,142] = 17.45, p < .001, η2=.20).  A Tukey’s HSD post hoc test revealed that the 
hope appeal created more perceived hope than the fear or rational appeal (p < .05). 
Similarly, participants who received the fear appeal judge the message as more fear-
inducing (M= 4.59, SD= 1.17) than those who received the hope appeal (M= 3.57, SD= 
1.19) or rational appeal (M= 3.77, SD= 1.12; F[2,145] = 8.462, p < .001, η2= .10) . Thus, 
the emotion inductions were effective.   
 It is assumed in this dissertation that all else being equal, both hope and fear 
appeals can be persuasive. The appeals were tested to ensure similar levels of 
persuasiveness for this study.  Participants who received a hope appeal did not judge the 
message as more persuasive (M=4.79, SD= .90) than those who received the fear appeal 





Thus, similar levels rule out the possibility of differential effects due to perceived 
persuasiveness.  
 The messages were also examined to determine that the hope and fear appeals 
elicited their theorized appraisal patterns (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). First, hope and fear 
share the appraisal of importance. Therefore, these messages should elicit high, similar 
levels of importance.  Indeed, participants who received a hope appeal did not judge the 
message topic as more important (M=6.14, SD= 1.24) than those who received the fear 
appeal (M= 6.39, SD= .78) or rational appeal (M= 6.22, SD= .97; F[2,146] = .568, p > 
.05).  
 Hope appeals should increase certainty, while fear appeals should lower certainty. 
Certainty as a function of emotional appeal was therefore also examined. An ANOVA 
was performed on the participants’ reported level of certainty about future financial 
security. Results revealed that participants who read a hope appeal (M= 4.69, SD= 1.00) 
reported statistically higher levels of certainty than fear appeal recipients (M= 3.10, SD= 
1.31) or rational appeal recipients (M= 4.09, SD= 1.07; F[2,145] = 23.63, p < .001, η2= 
.25).  Concurrently, hope and fear appeals should be relatively uncertain. On a 1 to 7 
scale, values of 1-3 would be considered high uncertainty, whereas a value of 4 is 
considered moderately uncertain. Scores of 5-7 would indicate higher levels of certainty. 
A one-sample t-test of the hope appeal recipients (M= 4.69, SD= 1.00) against a score of 
5.00 showed statistical difference, t(92)= -3.007, p < .01. It can therefore be concluded 
that receivers of the hope appeal appraised this issue as moderately uncertain after 





 Hope appeals should be judged as more goal congruent than fear appeals. An 
ANOVA was performed on perceived goal congruence as a function of appeal. Results 
revealed that participants who read a hope appeal (M= 4.57, SD= .86) judged their 
message as more goal congruent than fear appeal recipients (M= 3.03, SD= 1.26) and 
rational appeal recipients (M= 3.69, SD= 1.05; F[2,144] = 29.836, p < .05, η2= .29). 
Tukey’s post hoc test revealed that the hope appeal was more goal-congruent than the 
fear appeal (p < .001) and the rational appeal (p < .05).  
 Hope and fear appeals are posited to differ on the appraisal of pleasantness. Hope 
appeals should be judged as more pleasant than fear appeals (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). 
An ANOVA was performed on perceived pleasantness as a function of appeal. Results 
revealed that participants who read a hope appeal (M= 4.50, SD= .91) judged their 
message as more pleasant than fear appeal recipients (M= 2.71, SD= 1.08) or rational 
appeal recipients (M= 4.00, SD= .91; F[2,142] = 38.472, p < .05, η2= .35). Tukey’s post 
hoc test revealed that the hope appeal was judged as statistically significantly more 
pleasant than the fear appeal (p < .05).  
Pilot Study 3:  Recommendations and Sources Pilot 
 Overview. A separate pilot test was conducted to test the manipulations of 
recommendation and source quality. The constructed recommendations were factually 
true, but varied in applicability and level of feasibility for the typical college student. All 
recommendations were exactly 44 words, and within a grade level (8.0) of readability.  
Participants were asked to rate all of the proposed recommendations. All tested 





 Source quality was also pilot tested. Participants were given a series of names and 
associated titles of (bogus) individuals to rate on a competence scale. The job titles were 
created to manipulate weak and strong sources for financial advice. All sources had 
gender ambiguous names. Participants were to rate perceived expertise of each person 
(McCroskey &Teven, 1999). All tested sources are located in Table 5.  
Participants  
 Ninety-nine students from a large Mid-Atlantic University in the United States 
participated in this pilot study. The mean age was approximately 20 (SD = 1.79). Twenty-
three percent of the participants were males (N = 23) and 76% were female (N =75). One 
person did not identify as male or female. Participants were asked to indicate all races 
that applied to them. Seventy-three percent identified as Non-Hispanic White (N =73), 
12% identified as Black or African American (N =12), 11% Asian or Asian America (N 
=11), 4% as Hispanic or Latino (N =4). Five percent of participants in the sample 
identified as being other races (N =5). The participants included 21% freshman (N = 21), 
23% sophomores (N =23), 20% juniors (N =20), and 35% seniors (N =35). At the end of 
the study, students were asked to estimate their household income for 2010. Ten percent 
of the students estimated their household’s income to be below $60,000 per year, 24% 
estimated their household income above $60,000 but below $100,000, 20% estimated 
their household income between $100,000 but below $150,000, 9% estimated their 
household income to be above $150,000 but below $200,000, 13% estimated their 
household income above $200,000 but below $250,000, and 19% estimated that their 
household income was over $250,000 in 2010. Five percent of the students did not 






 A repeated measures design was utilized for this pilot study. After providing 
consent, participants were asked respond to basic demographic information. They were 
then asked to read a series of financial advice targeted toward college students. Students 
read and responded to 11 recommendations. Then, participants were asked to rate the 
expertise of 5 varied sources of financial information. The order of recommendation and 
source presentation was randomized within and across participants. Finally, participants 
were asked to indicate their income bracket and thanked for their participation.     
Instrumentation 
 Perceived recommendation quality. Perceived quality of each recommendation 
was assessed using a 5-item Likert scale. Participants were asked to indicate their 
agreement to the statements on a 7-point scale (strongly disagree, moderately disagree, 
slightly disagree, neutral, slightly agree, moderately agree, and strongly agree).Questions 
included: the recommendation is strong; the recommendation is deceptive; the 
recommendation is good; the recommendation is logical; and, the recommendation is 
weak (adapted from Thorson, Christ, & Caywood, 1991). The measure was reliable (M= 
4.78, SD= .99, α = .90). 
 Source expertise. Perceived source expertise was assessed using a 4-item, 7-point 
Likert scale adapted from a well-known source credibility scale (McCroskey &Teven, 
1999). Participants were asked to indicate their perceptions of each source’s intelligence, 
trustworthiness, expertise, and competence to provide financial advice on a 7-point scale 
(strongly disagree, moderately disagree, slightly disagree, neutral, slightly agree, 





were: “for financial advice, this source is: competent, expert, intelligent, untrustworthy.”  
The measure was reliable (M= 4.47, SD= 1.04, α = .85).   
Results  
 Determining the high and low quality recommendations was done in a multi-stage 
process. First, the means and standard deviations for each recommendation were 
examined (see Table 4). Recommendation 4 was perceived as the highest quality message 
(M= 5.80, SD= .93), followed by Recommendation 2 (M= 5.71, SD= .91), 
Recommendation 5 (M= 5.50, SD= .97), and Recommendation 3 (M = 5.49, SD= 1.06). 
Conversely, Recommendation 10 was rated the lowest (M=3.11, SD= 1.28), followed by 
Recommendation 11 (M= 3.52, SD= 1.35), Recommendation 7 (M=3.72, SD= 1.28) and 
Recommendation 8 (M= 4.54, SD= 1.22). Paired sample t-tests with Bonferroni 
corrections revealed that all those rated as having the highest quality were significantly 
different than those all messages rated as being the lowest quality messages.  
 Determining the source with the highest and lowest perceived source quality was 
also done in a two-step process. First, the means and standard deviations for the 6 tested 
sources were examined (see Table 5). Source 1 was perceived as having the highest level 
of credibility (M= 5.66 and SD= 1.09), while Source 5 had the lowest perceived 
credibility (M= 3.03, SD= 1.95). A paired-samples t-test revealed that the high and low 
quality sources were statistically different (t[93]= 14.63, p < .001). These sources were 









 A 3(Appeal: hope appeal, fear appeal, or rational appeal) x 2(Recommendation 
Quality: low or high) x 2(Source Expertise: low or high) independent groups 
experimental design was utilized. Participants were randomly assigned to an appeal and 
recommendations with a source attribution.  
Participants  
 Student participants were recruited via an online via the Department of 
Communication participant pool at a Mid-Atlantic University. An a priori power analysis 
(α = .05, β = .80, d= .15) revealed that at least 432 participants were needed (G*Power; 
Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996). Participants received a small amount of course credit 
for study completion. Moreover, a small incentive allowed students to voluntarily enter to 
win a $200 gift card for Amazon.com. One winner was randomly selected.  
 A total of 637 people started the survey and 621 participants completed the entire 
study (sixteen people stopped taking the survey between the consent form and first 
question; these cases were deleted). The final 621 participants were between the ages of 
18 and 33, with a mean age of approximately 20 years (M= 19.92, SD = 1.78). Females 
(N= 407, 67%) outnumbered males (N= 205, 33%), with 9 student opting not to identify 
their sex. Participants were asked to indicate all races and/or ethnicities they identify 
with. Sixty-two percent identified as Non-Hispanic White (N= 399), 15% as Asian-
American (N= 93), 14% as African-American (N= 84), 6% as Latino/a (N= 38, 6%), 3% 
as Middle Eastern (3%, N= 20), 1% as Native American (N= 7), .5% as Pacific Islander 





sophomores, 21% were juniors (N= 130), and 22% were seniors (N = 139). Eleven 
students did not indicate their year in school.  
 At the end of the study, students were asked to estimate their household income 
for 2011. Fifteen percent (N = 92) of the students estimated their household’s income to 
be below $60,000 per year, 20% (N= 119) estimated their household income above 
$60,000 but below $100,000, 27% estimated (N= 160) their household income between 
$100,000 but below $160,000, 11% (N= 66) estimated their household income to be 
above $160,000 but below $200,000, 10% (N = 61) estimated their household income 
above $200,000 but below $250,000, and 16% (N= 101) estimated that their household 
income was over $250,000 in 2011.Twenty-two participants indicated they were unable 
to estimate or not comfortable providing information about their household income for 
the previous year.  
Procedures 
 Students in Department of Communication courses during the Spring 2012 
semester were invited to participate in the study via the online participation pool. A link 
from the participation pool website directed students to Survey Monkey. Participants 
provided consent before beginning the study. Participants first filled out a battery of 
measures in which the life orientation test was embedded. Then, participants were 
randomly assigned to receive a hope, fear, or rational appeal. The hope and fear appeals 
were designed to spur appraisals of importance, uncertainty, and goal congruency (see 
Pilot Test 2). For the hope appeal, the message was designed to increase certainty and 
highlight goal congruence in the environment, thereby inducing a significant amount of 





incongruence in the environment to induce a significant amount of fear. The rational 
appeal was an informational piece on credit scores that did not elicit a significant amount 
of any type of emotion. As previously mentioned, all messages were pilot tested. 
 After receiving the message, participants were asked to list their thoughts about 
the appeal and indicate the perceived persuasiveness of the appeal. The order of question 
presentation for each measure was randomized. All participants were then randomly 
assigned to receive four recommendations manipulated to be low or high argument 
quality, attributed to a low or high quality source (see Pilot Test 3). These 
recommendations conveyed financial advice for college students that varied in their 
applicability and feasibility for typical college students. The sources were manipulated to 
be perceived as high expertise or low expertise on the topic of personal finance. The 
sources were given gender ambiguous names to reduce potential bias.  
 Participants were asked to respond to the recommendations and source via 
thought listing.  They also responded to perceived recommendation and source quality 
measures. The order of question presentation for each measure was randomized.  All 
participants then completed approximately 10 minutes of measures meant to fill time 
before a recall task. Finally, they engaged in a memory recognition task, whereby they 
indicated which recommendations and source were or were not provided to them. 
Participants were debriefed, thanked for their participation, and offered the opportunity to 
enter a raffle.   
Preliminary Data Analysis 
 The data were first examined to ensure they met the assumptions of the general 





was tested for normality, homogeneity of variance, and independence. For normality, 
frequency distributions for the residuals were examined; skew, kurtosis, and results of a 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test were also examined. To examine homogeneity of variance, 
residuals were examined to ensure that they did not systematically increase or decrease; 
in addition, the result of a Levene’s test was examined as part of each statistical test. To 
examine the assumption of independence, residual plots were examined to ensure the 
patterns of residuals were random and not in a cyclical pattern (Lomax, 2006). Finally, 
skew and kurtosis was examined; none of the variables in this study were significantly 
skewed or kurtotic. Felt hope, uncertainty, goal congruence, pleasantness, perceived 
recommendation quality and the source perception variables did not meet the assumption 
for homogeneity of variance as indicated by results of Levene’s tests. Log, square root, 
and other transformations were attempted on each of these variables to meet the 
assumption of homogeneity; however, none of the transformations significantly altered 
the parameter test. The inability to meet the assumption of homoegenity of variance or 
transform the variables to meet this assumption is likely due to the use of 1-7 Likert 
scales, which limit variance (Fink, 2009). For these variables, Dunnett’s C post-hoc tests, 
which do not assume homogeneity of variance or equal variances, were used in place of 
Tukey’s HSD post hoc tests. Confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) were conducted on 
each scale using LISREL 8.80 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2006). Fit statistics for each scale 
are reported below. The Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), 
Standardized Root Mean Residual (SRMR), and Comparative Fit Index (CFI) were used 
as fit indices. RMSEA is in the parsimonious index class, SRMR is in the absolute index 
class, and CFI is in the incremental index class.2  
                                                 





 In conducting the CFA, the measurement model of all the items and their 
proposed variables were entered into LISREL to ensure the validity of proposed scales. 
Items were examined to ensure they explained variance of their proposed variable and did 
not cross-load with any other variable.  
 The first model with all items resulted in an incomputable model; specifically, the 
matrix was not positive definite. An examination of the items revealed a potential 
measurement issue. Two items “This message was troubling” and “This message was 
negatively-toned” were originally intended to measure the appraisal of pleasantness (rc); 
however, the modification index revealed that they were both better indicators of felt 
fear. This finding made sense and the items were dropped from the pleasantness measure 
and analysis. The edited measurement model was then analyzed and had satisfactory fit 
on two of three fit indices (SRMR= .039, RMSEA= .054, CFI= .99).   
Instrumentation 
 Felt hope. Perception of felt hope was measured with five items that asked 
participants to respond to statements about how the message made them feel (hopeful, 
positive, optimistic, enthusiastic, and encouraged). Respondents were asked to indicate 
their level of emotion on a 1-7 scale, with 1 indicating none of the feeling and 7 
indicating a great deal of the feeling. The scale was reliable (M= 3.41, SD= 1.42, α= 
.934). Confirmatory factor analysis showed that the items loaded on one factor with 
satisfactory fit (RMSEA = .066, SRMR = .011, CFI= 1.00).  
 Felt fear. Perception of felt fear was measured with five items that asked 
participants to respond to statements about how the message made them feel (despair, 





of emotion on a 1-7 scale, with 1 indicating none of the feeling and 7 indicating a great 
deal of the feeling. The scale was reliable (M= 3.62, SD= 1.42, α= .925). Confirmatory 
factor analysis demonstrated that all factors load on a single factor with marginal fit 
(RMSEA= .126, SRMR= .022, CFI= .98).   
 Uncertainty. Perceived uncertainty was measured with four items that asked 
respondents how they felt about their financial prospects after reading the message. 
Participants were asked how the message influenced their perceptions about the 
possibility of financial success, belief in achieving personal financial goals, possibility of 
achieving financial goals, and overall likelihood of attainment. Participants were asked to 
indicate their agreement to the statements on a 7-point scale (strongly disagree, 
moderately disagree, slightly disagree, neutral, slightly agree, moderately agree, and 
strongly agree).The scale was reliable (M= 3.45, SD= 1.28, α= .84). Confirmatory factor 
analysis demonstrated that all items loaded on a single factor with satisfactory fit 
(RMSEA= .006, SRMR= .0085, CFI= 1.00). 
 Goal congruence. Perceived goal congruence was measured with five items that 
asked participants to respond to questions about what the message communicated (make 
financial security: seem more possible, consistent with goals, increased likelihood of goal 
of financial security, contained information that leads to belief goal is possible, was 
consistent with ideals). Participants indicated their agreement to the statements on 7-point 
scales (strongly disagree, moderately disagree, slightly disagree, neutral, slightly agree, 
moderately agree, and strongly agree). The scale was reliable (M= 3.78, SD= 1.33, α= 
.889). Confirmatory factor analysis demonstrated that all items loaded on a single factor 





 Pleasantness. Perceived message pleasantness was measured with four items that 
asked participants to indicate their response to reading the message (the message was: 
enjoyable, pleasant to read, contained positive information, and made me feel good about 
the future]). Participants indicated their agreement to the statements on 7-point scales 
(strongly disagree, moderately disagree, slightly disagree, neutral, slightly agree, 
moderately agree, and strongly agree). The scale was reliable (M= 3.32, SD= 1.34, α= 
.891). Confirmatory factor analysis demonstrated that all items loaded on a single factor 
with marginal fit (RMSEA= .15, SRMR= .023, CFI= .98).  
  Importance. Perceived importance was measured with four items that asked 
respondents about the importance of financial security to them (irrelevant to me [rc], no 
bearing on me [rc], no concern to me [rc], important). Participants were asked to indicate 
their agreement to the statement on a 7-point scale (strongly disagree, moderately 
disagree, slightly disagree, neutral, slightly agree, moderately agree, and strongly agree). 
The scale was reliable (M= 6.23, SD= 1.03, α= .843). Confirmatory factor analysis 
demonstrated that all items loaded on a single factor with satisfactory fit (RMSEA= .054, 
SRMR= .014, CFI= 1.00).  
 Perceived recommendation quality. Perceived recommendation quality was 
measured by asking participants to respond to five items about the recommendation 
(useful, good, weak [rc], illogical [rc], and effective). Participants were asked to indicate 
their agreement to the statement on a 7-point scale (strongly disagree, moderately 
disagree, slightly disagree, neutral, slightly agree, moderately agree, and strongly agree). 





demonstrated that all items loaded on a single factory with marginal  fit (RMSEA= .114, 
SRMR= .02, CFI= .99).  
 Perceived source quality. Perceived source competence was assessed using two 
dimensions of a well-known source credibility scale (McCroskey &Teven, 1999). 
Participants were asked to indicate their perceptions of each source’s intelligence, level 
of training, expertise, how informed they seemed, level of stupidity, and competence to 
provide financial advice on a 7-point scale (strongly disagree, moderately disagree, 
slightly disagree, neutral, slightly agree, moderately agree, and strongly agree). The six 
item measure was reliable (M= 4.62, SD= 1.39, α = .919). Confirmatory factor analysis 
demonstrated that all items loaded on a single factor with satisfactory fit (RMSEA= .086, 
SRMR= .023, CFI= .99).  
 Perceived source trustworthiness was assessed using a 6-item, 7-point Likert scale 
(McCroskey &Teven, 1999). Participants were asked to indicate their perceptions of each 
source’s level of honesty, selfishness (rc), trustworthiness, virtuousness, and morality to 
provide financial advice on a 7-point scale (strongly disagree, moderately disagree, 
slightly disagree, neutral, slightly agree, moderately agree, and strongly agree). The 
measure was reliable (M= 4.66, SD= 1.09, α = .838). Confirmatory factor analysis 
demonstrated that all items loaded on a single factor with marginal fit (RMSEA= .204, 
SRMR= .076, CFI= .91).  
Covariates  
 Life orientation test (LOT). Respondents’ orientation to life (optimism vs. 
pessimism) was assessed using the Life Orientation Test (LOT). The scale developed by 





versus pessimistic personality characteristics. Scheier and Carver (1985) found that these 
items had satisfactory internal consistency (α= .76) and test-retest reliability (r= .79). 
LOT was measured using a 6-item 7-point Likert scale ranging from “1” (strongly 
disagree) to “7” (strongly agree). Questions included “If something can go wrong for me, 
it will,” and “I always look on the bright side of things.” The scale was reliable (M = 
4.87, SD = 1.05, α = .82). Confirmatory factor analysis revealed that all factors loaded on 
one dimension with marginal fit (RMSEA= .276, SRMR= .11, CFI= .82).  
 Financial behavior efficacy.  The author created a scale to measure perceived 
efficacy to accomplish a variety of financial behaviors. The scale consists of 20 items that 
detailed different types of financial behaviors necessary for financial security after 
graduation. Participants responded to 7-point Likert scales ranging from “1” (absolutely 
no confidence) to “7” (completely confident). Items were prefaced with “Please rate your 
confidence in being able to accomplish each of the following items:” and included 
“create a realistic personal budget,” “manage a credit card,” and “pay student loan bills.” 
See Table 6 for the correlations between items. The three-factor scale identified in the 
pilot study was submitted to confirmatory factor analysis; the items satisfactorily loaded 
on the three factors (RMSEA= .085, SRMR= .052, CFI= .97). The first factor titled 
“efficacy for establishing financial security” was composed of 12 items that that formed a 
reliable scale (M= 4.71, SD= 1.25). The second factor titled “budgeting” included 5 items 
that formed a reliable scale (M= 5.75, SD= .974).  The third factor titled “ability to 
accurately manage finances” formed a reliable scale (M= 4.39, SD= .91). The three 
factors were summed to create an overall financial behavior scale, which was reliable (M 





 Income. At the end of the study, participants were asked to estimate their 
household income for 2011.    
Dependent Variables  
Thought listing. Participants were asked to list all of the thoughts they had while 
reading the appeal and then again while reading the recommendations.  Participants were 
instructed to use commas to separate individual thoughts. Thoughts were separated into 
individual units for coding. The coding scheme examined the relevancy (relevant or 
irrelevant) valence (supportive, non-supportive, or other), type of thought (cognitive or 
emotional), and if emotional, the discrete emotion communicated in the thought (hope, 
fear, anger, or other). A relevant thought was classified as any thought relating to the 
message topic or similar topics (e.g. personal finances, future success, money); an 
irrelevant thought was any utterances that did not in any conceivable way relate to the 
message or topic (e.g. I am hungry, I have a lot of homework). A message-supportive 
thought indicated that the participant had a positive feeling about the message, liked the 
message, or learned from the message (e.g. I was enlightened by this message). A 
counterargument indicated negative responses toward the message (e.g. This is dumb).  
Finally, a neutral thought was defined as a thought that appeared to have no valence (e.g. 
There are three credit bureaus).  Neutral thoughts will not be analyzed, but were provided 
in the instructions so that coders understood that not all thoughts are either supportive or 
non-supportive. Next, the type of thought was classified as cognitive or affective. 
Affective thoughts were defined as those that contained an emotion term or emotional 





cognitive. If the thought was classified as affective, coders were asked to indicate which 
emotion (hope, fear, anger, or other) the affective thought referenced.  
Two pairs of independent research assistants were trained to code the data. The 
pairs met with the researcher to learn to appropriately code the data. The first pair of 
research assistants coded the thoughts generated in response to the appeal (N= 1,675). 
After training and practice on other data sets, they coded 10% of the responses as a pilot 
test. Percent agreements for relevancy (100%), valence (94%), type (93%), and emotion 
(87%) demonstrated that the pair was coding thoughts consistently.  Cohen’s Kappa was 
calculated as a measure of inter-coder reliability (Cohen, 1960; 1968). The coders were 
reliable in their judgments of relevancy (κ = 1.00), valence (κ = .69), type (κ = .733), and 
emotion (κ = .822). The remaining coding was divided among the two assistants and 
checked by the researcher.  Disagreements were resolved though discussion with the 
researcher.   
The other pair of research assistants was trained to code the thought responses to 
the recommendations (N= 1,373). The same coding scheme was used for this data. The 
coding scheme examined the relevancy (relevant or irrelevant) valence (supportive, non-
supportive, or other), type of thought (cognitive or affective), and if applicable, the 
discrete emotion communicated in the thought (hope, fear, anger, or other). Research 
assistants were trained, practiced on other data sets, and then coded 10% of the responses 
as a pilot test. Percent agreements for relevancy (100%), valence (95%), type (97%), and 
emotion (90%) demonstrated that the pair was coding thoughts consistently. Cohen’s 
Kappa was calculated as a measure of inter-coder reliability (Cohen, 1960; 1968). The 





= .66), and emotion (κ = .48). The remaining coding was divided among the two 
assistants and checked by the researcher. Disagreements were resolved though discussion 
with the researcher.   
 Recall. Recall was measured using memory recognition, a method used in 
previous communication research (Mitchell, 2000; Skalski et al., 2009). For the 
recognition task, twelve items were displayed. In addition to four recommendations 
presented to each participant, the recommendations for the other condition and four 
additional strong recommendations that were not mentioned to any participants were 
included. Participants were asked to select each of the recommendations they had 
previously read during the study. There were no minimum or maximum criteria indicated, 
so that participants felt free to check as few or many responses as they desired. For 
source recall, participants were asked to indicate which of six listed sources had provided 
the recommendations they read. Participants could check as few or many of the sources 
as they desired, and also indicate if they had viewed a source not listed through a 
comment box.   
 Recommendations and sources correctly identified were tallied as “hits;” 
recommendations and sources the participant viewed, but were not correctly identified 
were tallied as “misses;’” recommendations and sources the participant did not view but 
indicated viewing were tallied as “false alarms.” A research assistant tallied the hits, 
misses, and false alarms for each participant. To do this, he first examined what condition 
each participant was in and the recommendations and source that corresponded to that 





selected, and from there was able to tally the hits (M= 3.97, SD= 1.34), misses (M= .879, 





Chapter 5: Results of the Main Study 
Manipulation Checks  
 Manipulation checks for the emotional appeal, recommendations, and source were 
completed using Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA). The three covariates were life 
orientation (LOT), financial efficacy, and income; when the covariates elicited 
statistically significant main effects, those effects are reported. Means and standard 
deviations for the emotional appeal inductions are reported in Table 7. Manipulation 
checks for the recommendations and source are located in Table 8.   
 Emotion elicitation. Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) was performed on the 
participants’ reported emotional responses to the message they read. Participants who 
received a hope appeal judged the message as more hopeful (M=4.31, SD= 1.40) than 
those who received the fear appeal (M= 2.53, SD= 1.18) or rational appeal (M= 3.34, SD= 
1.04; F[2,612] = 110.38, p < .001, η2= .30). Because equal variances between the groups 
could not be assumed (felt hope did not meet the assumption of homogeneity of 
variance), Dunnett’s C post-hoc tests were used (Lomax, 2006). These post-hoc tests 
revealed that the hope appeal created more perceived hope than the fear or rational appeal 
(p < .05). The rational appeal created less hope than then hope appeal, but more than the 
fear appeal (p < .05).  
 Similarly, participants who received the fear appeal judged the message as more 
fear-inducing (M= 4.34, SD= 1.35) than those who received the hope appeal (M= 3.18, 
SD= 1.35) or rational appeal (M= 3.39, SD= 1.28; F[2,612] = 43.96, p < .001, η2= .13) . 





appeal (p < .05); the hope and rational appeal did not differ statistically on elicitation of 
fear. Thus, the emotion inductions were effective.   
Uncertainty. Next, the appraisal of uncertainty was examined. Participants who 
received a hope appeal reported the message contained information to make them feel 
more certainty (M=4.19, SD= 1.03) than those who received the fear appeal (M= 2.45, 
SD= 1.24) or rational appeal (M= 3.55, SD= .98; F[2,610] = 120.69, p < .001, η2= .28). 
Because equal variances cannot be assumed, Dunnett’s C post hoc tests were used 
(Lomax, 2006). These post-hoc tests revealed that the hope appeal was appraised as 
creating more certainty than the fear or rational appeal (p < .05). The rational appeal was 
also judged to evoke more certainty than the fear appeal (p < .05). Again, to ensure that 
the participants still felt uncertainty after receiving the hope appeal (a necessary condition 
for hope), a one-sample t-test was conducted with hope appeal recipients. The one-
sample t-test revealed a statistically significant difference between the mean of the 
appraisals of uncertainty by hope appeal recipients (M= 4.19, SD= 1.03) and the score of 
5, or moderate certainty, t(212)= -11.48, p < .001.    
Goal Congruence. Next, the appraisal of goal congruence was examined. 
Participants who received a hope appeal reported perceiving the message as more goal 
congruent (M=4.64, SD= 1.07) than those who received the fear appeal (M= 2.68, SD= 
1.16) or rational appeal (M= 3.94, SD= .95; F[2,610] = 176.705, p < .001, η2= .37). 
Because equal variances cannot be assumed, Dunnett’s C post hoc tests were used 
(Lomax, 2006). These post-hoc tests revealed that the hope appeal was appraised as more 
goal congruent than the fear or rational appeal (p < .05). The rational appeal was also 





 Pleasantness. Next, the appraisal for pleasantness was examined. Participants 
who received a hope appeal judged the message as more pleasant (M=4.21, SD= 1.23) 
than those who received the fear appeal (M= 2.33, SD= 1.07) or rational appeal (M= 3.33, 
SD= .97; F[2,611] = 147.84, p < .001, η2= .33). Because equal variances cannot be 
assumed, Dunnett’s C post hoc tests were used (Lomax, 2006). These post-hoc tests 
revealed that the hope appeal was perceived as statistically significantly more pleasant 
than the fear or rational appeal (p < .05). The rational appeal was also judged as more 
pleasant than the fear appeal (p < .05).  
Importance. The appraisal for importance was also examined. Participants who 
received a hope appeal (M= 6.22, SD= 1.06) did not judge the topic financial security as 
more important than participants who received a fear appeal (M= 6.16, SD= 1.06) or 
rational appeal (M= 6.32, SD= .96; F[2,610] = 1.228, p > .05). As hypothesized, all 
participants found the topic of financial security highly important.  
 Recommendation quality. Perceived recommendation quality as a function of 
the recommendation quality manipulation was also examined. An ANCOVA revealed a 
main effect for recommendation quality (F[3,599] = 105.50, p < .001, η2= .34), such that 
the conditions with high quality recommendations (with a high quality source, M= 5.70, 
SD= 1.06; and with a low-quality source, M= 5.72, SD= .974) were rated as having 
higher argument quality than the low quality recommendations (with a high quality 
source, M= 3.75, SD= 1.58; and with a low quality source, M= 3.80, SD=1.65).  
 Perceived source quality. Perceived source quality was measured as a function 
of perceived source competence and perceived source trustworthiness. The manipulation 





did not occur. An ANCOVA revealed a main effect for recommendation, not source, 
quality, F(3, 591) = 70.80, p < .001, η2= .26. Because equal variances could not be 
assumed, Dunnett’s C was used for post-hoc tests; results revealed that the means were 
not in the predicted direction. Instead, the recommendation quality guided perceptions of 
source competence. The high quality source (M= 5.46, SD= .99) and low quality source 
(M= 5.15, SD= .91) were both rated highly when associated with high quality 
recommendations; the high quality source (M= 3.99, SD= 1.42) and low quality source 
(M= 3.81, SD= 1.39) associated with the low quality recommendations were rated as less 
competent. Perceived source trustworthiness as a function of appeal type and 
recommendation strength was also examined. An ANCOVA revealed main effects for 
appeal type and recommendation strength. Recommendation strength also elicited 
significant differences in perceived source trustworthiness, F(3, 601) = 85.07, p < .001, 
η2= .29. Because equal variances could not be assumed, Dunnett’s C was used for post-
hoc tests; results revealed that the means were not in the predicted direction.  Like source 
competence, the recommendation quality guided perceptions of source trustworthiness. 
The high quality source (M= 5.22, SD= .83) and low quality source (M= 5.01, SD= .77) 
were both rated highly when associated with high quality recommendations; the high 
quality source (M= 4.00, SD= 1.08) and low quality source (M= 4.57, SD= 1.09) 
associated with the low quality recommendations were rated as less trustworthy.  
Therefore, the source manipulation is not considered independently in this investigation. 
Explanations for the failed source manipulation are reviewed in the discussion section. 






Test of Hypotheses & Research Questions 
To test each prediction and research question, Analysis of Covariance 
(ANCOVA) was employed.  The three covariates were life orientation (LOT), financial 
efficacy, and income; when the covariates elicited statistically significant main effects, 
those effects are reported.  Means and standard deviations are also provided in table 
form:  the emotional appeal thought listing dependent variables are located in Table 9; the 
recommendation-related thought listing as a function of emotional appeals are located in 
Table 10; the recommendation-related thought listing as a function of recommendation 
quality are located in Table 11; the posited interactions on thought listing dependent 
variables are located in Table 12; for recall as a function of emotional appeals in Table 
13; for recall as a function of recommendation quality in Table 14; and, recall as a 
function of the posited interactions in Table 15.   
Thought Listing: Hypotheses and research questions related to processing 
the emotional appeal. Hypothesis 1 predicted that hope appeal recipients would have 
fewer relevant thoughts and more irrelevant thoughts than fear appeal recipients. First, 
irrelevant thoughts as a function of the appeal type were examined. An Analysis of 
Covariance (ANCOVA) revealed differences between the groups, F(2, 550) = 3.71, p < 
.05, η2= .01. Recipients of the rational appeal generated the most irrelevant thoughts (M= 
.075, SD= .318), followed by hope appeal recipients (M= .04, SD=.222) and fear appeal 
recipients (M= .01, SD= .11). The Bonferroni post-hoc test (Bonferroni was used for post 
hoc test because it adjusts error variance for the statistically significant covariate) 






Next, the amount of relevant thoughts generated as a function of emotional appeal 
type was examined. An ANCOVA revealed a main effect for one of the covariates, Life 
Orientation (LOT), F(1, 559) = 4.149, p < .05, η2= .007. Fear appeal recipients (M= 3.01, 
SD= 1.47) generated the most relevant thoughts about the appeal, F(2, 550) = 10.99, p < 
.001, η2= .04, followed by hope appeal recipients (M= 2.64, SD= 1.49) and rational 
appeal recipients (M= 2.31, SD= 1.13). The Bonferroni post-hoc test revealed that all 
groups were statistically different from each other (p < .05). Hypothesis 1 was partially 
supported.  
It was predicted, via Hypothesis 2, that hope appeal recipients would generate 
more supportive thoughts about the emotional appeal than would fear appeal recipients. 
An ANCOVA revealed a main effect for one of the covariates, Life Orientation (LOT), 
F(1, 553) = 7.571, p < .01, η2= .01. Hope appeal recipients (M= 2.28, SD= 1.53) 
generated more supportive thoughts about the emotional appeal than rational appeal 
recipients (M= 1.76, SD= 1.25); but, fear appeal recipients (M= 2.02, SD= 1.53) did not 
generate fewer supportive thoughts than hope appeal recipients or rational appeal 
recipients, F(2, 586) = 5.765, p < .01, η2= .019. The Bonferroni post-hoc test revealed 
that that the hope and rational appeal group were statistically different; neither group was 
different from the fear appeal condition.  
It was also predicted that hope appeal recipients would generate fewer 
counterarguments than fear appeal recipients. The ANCOVA revealed a difference in the 
amount of counterarguments generated as a function of emotional appeal, F(2, 585) = 
33.65, p < .001, η2= .10. Fear appeal recipients (M= .876, SD=1.22) generated more 





recipients (M= .184, SD= .475); but, hope appeal and rational appeal recipients did not 
differ statistically in the amount of counterarguments generated. Hypothesis 2 was 
partially supported.  
Research question 1 asked if generation of emotional thoughts would vary as a 
function of appeal type received. An ANCOVA revealed there were indeed significant 
differences in the amount of emotional thoughts generated by the conditions, F(2, 606) = 
29.18, p < .001, η2= .10. According to the Bonferroni post-hoc tests, the fear appeal (M= 
.820, SD= 1.05) and hope appeal recipients (M= .624, SD= .898) generated more 
emotional thoughts than rational appeal recipients (M= .160, SD= .440; p < .001). The 
emotional appeal conditions did not differ statistically in the amount of emotional 
thoughts generated.   
Research question 2 asked about the types of emotional thoughts generated as a 
function of appeal type, and whether that participants thoughts would “match” the type of 
emotional appeal they received.  An ANCOVA examining the number of hopeful 
thoughts generated as a function of appeal type revealed a main effect, F(2, 200) = 36.53, 
p < .001, η2= .27. Hope appeal recipients generated statistically significantly more 
hopeful thoughts (M= .97, SD= .813) than did fear appeal recipients (M= .20, SD= .428) 
and rational appeal recipients (M= .21, SD= .51; p < .001). Further evidence for the 
match as a function of appeal type was revealed when looking at generation of fearful 
thoughts. An ANCOVA examining the number of fearful thoughts generated as a 
function of appeal type revealed a main effect for one of the covariates, financial 
efficacy, F(1, 199) = 16.81, p < .05, η2= .02. Fear appeal recipients generated more 





rational appeal recipients (M= .875, SD= .68), F(2, 199) = 16.81, p < .001, η2= .13. 
Bonferroni post-hoc test results showed that the fear appeal generated statistically 
significant more fearful thoughts than the hope appeal (p < .05).  
Hypotheses and research questions related to recommendation processing.  
Hypothesis 3 predicted that hope appeal recipients would generate fewer 
supportive thoughts about the recommendations than fear appeal recipients.  The emotion 
conditions were not expected to differ in counterarguments generated An ANCOVA 
revealed a difference for the amount of supportive thoughts about the recommendations 
generated, F(2, 544) = 4.64, p < .05, η2= .016. Bonferroni’s post-hoc test revealed that 
fear appeal recipients (M=1.41, SD=1.20) generated more supportive thoughts about the 
recommendations than hope appeal recipients (M= 1.13, SD= 1.08) and rational appeal 
recipients (M= 1.32, SD= 1.14). Fear and rational appeal recipients did not differ 
statistically. The second part of hypothesis three predicted that fear appeal recipients and 
hope appeal recipients would not differ in the amount of counterarguments generated 
about the recommendations. An ANCOVA revealed no statistical difference for the 
amount of counterarguments about the recommendation generated, F(2, 543) = 1.51, p > 
.05. Fear appeal recipients (M= .851, SD= 1.17) did not generate significantly more 
counterarguments than hope appeal recipients (M= .893, SD= 1.17) or rationally appeal 
recipients (M= .717, SD= 1.05). Hypothesis 3 was supported.  
Hypothesis 4 predicted that emotional appeal type and recommendation quality 
would interact to affect the generation of supportive thoughts about the recommendation. 
Specifically, it was posited that there would be an effect of recommendation quality on 





quality source would generate the most supportive thoughts, followed by the high quality 
recommendations with a weak source, the low quality recommendations with a high 
quality source, and the low quality recommendations with a low quality source. This 
effect was not predicted to be mirrored by the hope and fear appeal recipients. Results of 
a two-way ANCOVA did not support this prediction, as the interaction between appeal 
type and recommendation quality was not statistically significant, F(6, 543) = 1.11, p > 
.05. There was a presence of a main effect for recommendation quality, F(3, 543) = 
42.59, p < .001, η2= .18. Recipients of the high quality recommendations delivered by a 
high quality source (M= 1.80, SD= 1.22), as well as recipients of a high quality 
recommendations from a low quality source (M= 1.67, SD= .962), generated more 
supportive thoughts about the recommendations than recipients of the low quality 
recommendations with a high quality source (M= .755, SD= .99) and recipients of the low 
quality recommendations with a low quality source (M= .836, SD= .974). Hypothesis 3 
was not supported.  
Research question 3 asked if the number of relevant or irrelevant thoughts 
generated about the recommendations would vary as a function of emotional appeal type 
and recommendation quality. Results from a two-way ANCOVA did not support the 
proposed interaction for relevant thoughts, as the interaction between appeal type and 
recommendation quality was not significant, F(6, 550) = 1.291, p > .05.  There was again 
a main effect for recommendation quality, F(3, 550) = 3.49, p < .05, η2= .02. Participants 
in the low recommendation quality, low source quality condition generated the most 
relevant thoughts (M= 2.42, SD= 1.28), followed by the low quality recommendations, 





high quality source (M= 2.05, SD= 1.16), and finally the high quality recommendations 
with the low quality source (M= 2.03, SD= 1.17). Overall, the low quality 
recommendations garnered statistically more relevant thoughts than the high quality 
recommendations. In terms of irrelevant thoughts, a two-way ANCOVA showed that 
neither that emotional appeal type or recommendation quality influenced the amount of 
irrelevant thoughts generated, F(6, 550) = 1.14, p > .05.  
Research question 4 asked if emotional thoughts generated about the 
recommendations would vary as a function of emotional appeal and recommendation 
quality. Results from a two-way ANCOVA did not support this possible interaction on 
emotional thoughts, as the interaction between appeal type and recommendation quality 
was not significant, F(6, 548) = 1.037, p > .05. Results did reveal that financial efficacy 
was a significant covariate F(1, 548)= 2.940, p < .05, η2= .01. There was a main effect for 
appeal type of the generation of emotional thought about the recommendations, F(2, 597) 
= 3.047, p < .05, η2= .01. Rational appeal recipients generated the most emotional 
thoughts about the recommendations (M= .075, SD= .282), followed by fear appeal 
recipients (M= .046, SD= .23), and hope appeal recipients (M= .019, SD= .14). Statistical 
differences were limited to the rational versus hope appeal groups. Research question 5 
asked if the type of emotional thoughts generated about the recommendations would vary 
as a function of emotional appeal type or recommendation quality.  Two-way ANCOVAs 
revealed that emotional appeal type and recommendation quality did not affect the 
number of hopeful thoughts generated by participants, F(3, 14) = .414, p < .05; nor did it 
influence fearful thought generation, F(3, 14) = 1.01, p > .05. Noticeably, few 





Research questions relating to recall. Research question 5 asked if the total 
number of hits, misses, or false alarms would vary as a function of emotional appeal type. 
Total number of hits was examined first. An ANCOVA revealed that there was a main 
effect for one of the covariates, financial efficacy, F(1, 560) = 6.447, p < .05, η2= .01. 
Hope appeal recipients had more total hits (M= 4.18, SD= 1.14) than fear appeal 
recipients (M= 3.83, SD= 1.46), F(2, 560) = 2.93, p < .05, η2= .01. Whereas hope appeal 
and fear appeal recipients statistically differed (p < .05), the rational appeal recipients 
(M= 3.98, SD= 1.46) did not statistically differ in their total hits from either emotional 
appeal condition. 
Next, misses as a function of emotional appeal type were examined. An 
ANCOVA revealed that there was a main effect for one of the covariates, financial 
efficacy, F(1, 560) = 4.882, p < .05, η2= .006. Although fear appeal recipients (M= 1.00, 
SD= 1.30) averaged more misses than rational appeal recipients (M=.862, SD= 1.17), and 
hope appeal recipients (M= .778, SD= 1.12), results of an ANCOVA showed the 
difference was not statistically significant, F(2, 551) = 1.47, p > .05.  
Finally, the number of false alarms generated as a function of emotional appeal 
was examined. Results of an ANCOVA revealed that there was a main effect for one of 
the covariates, financial efficacy, F(1, 560) = 9.86, p < .01, η2= .02. There was no 
statistical difference in the amount of false alarms generated by hope appeal recipients 
(M= 1.17, SD= 1.85), fear appeal recipients (M= 1.26, SD= 2.03), and rational appeal 
recipients (M= 1.22, SD= 2.01), F(2, 551) = .009, p > .05.  
 Research question 6 asked if emotional appeal type and recommendation quality 





two-way ANCOVA revealed a main effect for one of the covariates, financial efficacy, 
F(1, 561) = 6.299, p < .05, η2= .01. The interaction between emotional appeal type and 
recommendation quality was not statistically significant, F(6, 551) = 1.57, p > .05.  
A two-way ANCOVA for total misses as a function of emotional appeal type and 
recommendation quality first revealed a main effect for one of the covariates, financial 
efficacy, F(1, 551) = 5.283, p < .05, η2= .009. The interaction of emotional appeal type 
and recommendation quality on total number of misses was not statistically significant, 
F(6, 551) = 1.65, p > .05.  
Finally, the total number of false alarms generated was examined as a function of 
emotional appeal and recommendation quality was examined. A two-way ANCOVA 
revealed a main effect for one of the covariates, financial efficacy, F(1, 551) = 9.764, p < 
.01, η2= .02. The interaction of emotional appeal type and recommendation quality on 
false alarms generated was not statistically significant, F(6, 551) = .955, p > .05.   
Post-hoc Analysis  
 Two models were created to provide a visual supplement of the hypothesized 
influence of emotional appeals, appraisals, felt emotion, and recommendation quality on 
the cognitive processing of recommendations. Because the thought listing variables were 
single indicator measures, path analysis was deemed the most appropriate structural 
equation modeling (Kline, 1998). Based on the hypotheses presented in the main study, 
emotional appeals were posited to elicit appraisals of goal congruence, pleasantness, 
uncertainty, and importance. The hope appeal was predicted to cause appraisals of high 
goal congruence, high pleasantness, low levels of uncertainty, and high importance. This 
appraisal pattern was predicted to elicit felt hope. Fear appeals were predicted to cause 





importance.  This appraisal pattern was predicted to elicit felt fear. Felt fear and felt hope 
were expected to drive supportive thoughts and counterarguments about the 
recommendations. Perceived recommendation quality was included in the path model as 
an exogenous variable because of its important predictive role in predicting supportive 
thoughts and counterarguments. Finally, supportive thoughts were predicted to positively 
influence behavioral intentions; counterarguments were predicted to negatively influence 
behavioral intention. Separate models, hypothesizing the same cognitive process, were 
created for hope appeal recipients and fear appeal recipients.  
   LISREL 8.80 was used to test the path models (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2006). 
Model parameters were estimated using maximum likelihood procedures. Statistical 
significance of each parameter estimate was determined by its t-statistic; this statistic is 
calculated by dividing the parameter estimate by its standard error. The first model run 
did not had acceptable fit, X2(32, N= 209)= 497.17, p < .001; RMSEA= .19; SRMR= .11; 
CFI= .44. The modification indices suggested adding a path from importance to 
behavioral intention and goal congruence to behavioral intention. Adding a direct path 
between pleasantness and supportive thoughts was also suggested.   
The revised model was tested for hope appeal recipients (see Figure 1) and 
showed satisfactory fit, X2(16, N= 209)= 40.01, p < .001; RMSEA= .086; SRMR= .042; 
CFI= .97 (see Table 16 for correlation matrix and standard deviations; see Table 18 for 
the unstandardized path coefficient values and their associated t-values).  
Some support was provided for the model of processing of hope appeal proffered 
in this dissertation; that said, not all the predicted paths were significant. Results 





appraisals of goal congruence and pleasantness; these appraisals predicted a reasonable 
amount of felt hope (R2= .64). Appraisals of unpleasantness and uncertainty predicted felt 
fear (R2= .33).  Recommendation quality, felt hope, felt fear, and appraisals of 
pleasantness influenced supportive thought generation (R2= .36). Only recommendation 
quality significantly influenced counterargument generation (R2= .43). Instead of 
significantly influencing feelings of hope or feel, appraisals of importance directly 
influenced behavioral intentions along with counterarguments.  Most of the variance for 
behavioral intentions remains unexplained (R2= .24).  
 
Figure 1. Path Analysis with standardized path coefficients with the participants who 
received a hope appeal. Supportive thoughts and counterarguments refer to thought 






Next, the model was tested for fear appeal recipients (see Figure 2) and showed 
satisfactory fit , X2 (16, N= 199)= 44.30, p < .001; RMSEA= .096; SRMR= .041; CFI= .97 
(see Table 17 for correlation matrix and standard deviations; see Table 19 for the 
unstandardized path coefficients and their associated t-values).  Support for this model 
demonstrates that fear appeal recipients go through a similar cognitive mechanisms when 
processing. That said, the pattern of results differed from hope appeal recipients.  
Appraisals of unpleasantness and importance drove feelings of fear (R2= .25). Appraisals 
of pleasantness and importance drove feelings of hope (R2= .63). Supportive thoughts in 
this model were only predicted by appraisals of pleasantness and perceptions of 
recommendation quality (R2= .32). Higher levels of perceived recommendation quality 
and felt hope predicted a reduced number of counterarguments. Behavioral intentions 
were predicted by supportive thoughts and appraisals of importance; that said, the 












































Figure 2. Path Analysis with standardized path coefficients with the participants who 
received a fear appeal. Supportive and counter-attitudinal thoughts refer to thought listing 
about the recommendations.  








Chapter 6: Discussion 
 Whereas the potential of appealing to negative emotions has captured the 
attention of many communication scholars (Averbeck et al., 2011; Banas, Turner, & 
Fink, 2008; Dillard & Shen, 2005; Lindsey, 2005; Nabi, 2002; Nabi, Roskos-Ewoldson, 
& Carpentier, 2008; O’Keefe, 2000; Turner, 2007; Turner, 2010; Turner & Rains, 2007; 
Turner & Underhill, in press; Witte, 1992), positive emotions have yet to receive the 
same level of attention and inquiry (Chadwick, 2011; Nabi & Prestin, 2007). A reason for 
this may be that the dominant view in communication research is that positive emotions 
generally elicit heuristic processing (Nabi, 1999). But, psychologists have long separated 
hope from other positive emotions and recognized its discrete effects upon the psyche 
(Fridja, 2007; Lazarus, 1991). Appraisal theorists have delineated hope through its 
appraisals of uncertainty, goal congruence, pleasantness, and importance (Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985). Unlike other positive emotions, hope has been theorized to influence 
motivation, attitudes, and behaviors in meaningful, long-term ways (MacInnis & de 
Mello, 2005). Marketing scholars have argued that hope’s power comes from its ability to 
bias cognition toward goal achievement. That said, none of these propositions were 
empirically tested before the current study.  
Based on the literature reviewed, a conceptual framework on how hope appeals 
could influence message processing was proffered. First, it was hypothesized that hope 
appeal recipients would not scrutinize the emotional appeal or counterargue its goal-
congruent content. Conversely, fear appeal recipients were expected to have fewer 
supportive thoughts and potentially more counterarguments about the goal-incongruent 





threat outlined in the appeal was expected to differ from the processing of the emotional 
appeal. It was hypothesized that due to the felt emotion and the importance of the topic, 
individuals would downgrade the importance of accuracy motivation subconsciously, and 
engage in biased processing. Hope appeal recipients theoretically would not have the 
motivation to scrutinize the recommendations and would therefore not discern between 
low and high quality arguments. Fear appeal recipients, seeking reassurance, would also 
not scrutinize the recommendations. The propositions for hope appeal recipients are in 
line with the literature on message processing as a function of positive and negative 
mood, which provided a theoretical foundation through which to understand the potential 
effects of hope appeals. If hope behaved like other positive emotions (specifically 
happiness), the hope appeal should lead to decreased motivation to process 
recommendations in an effort to maintain positive mood (Wegener & Petty, 1994).  
When deriving any theory of emotional appeal processing, it is necessary to also 
consider the effect of recommendation quality. The influence of argument strength on 
processing is documented in the dual-processing paradigm (Chaiken, 1980; Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986). To distinguish the effects of the emotional appeal and recommendation 
quality manipulations, the emotional appeals and recommendations were separated in this 
investigation (Das et al., 2003; de Hoog et al., 2005; 2008). The results for processing of 
the recommendations were expected to be the opposite of those found for appeal 
processing. Specifically, individuals encountering a fear appeal were hypothesized to be 
highly motivated to process the recommendations in a systematic, biased manner (Das et 
al., 2003; de Hoog et al., 2005; 2008), such that they would not counterargue a goal-





more willing to accept recommendations that accompany the message because of the 
increased efficacy the advice would give them to overcome the potential threat. This 
willingness to accept recommendations also means that they would be less likely to 
scrutinize the veracity of recommendations or the source that provided them. It was 
posited that fear appeal recipients, because of their desire for goal-congruent information, 
would generate more supportive thoughts about the recommendations, regardless of 
recommendation quality. The interaction of emotional appeal type and recommendation 
quality was predicted to influence thoughts about the recommendations. Specifically, it 
was posited that the rational appeal recipients would best differentiate between high and 
low quality recommendations.  
In addition to thought listing, recall of recommendations was also examined. 
Research questions about recall as a function of the emotional appeal received and 
recommendation quality were put forth; specifically, it was asked whether emotional 
appeal type alone, or interacting with recommendation quality, would influence the 
accuracy of recall.   
Summary of the results  
The first series of hypotheses and research questions examined how recipients of 
the varied emotional appeals processed those messages. Hypothesis 1 posited that hope 
appeal recipients would generate fewer relevant thoughts and more irrelevant thoughts 
about the emotional appeal than fear appeal recipients. Results demonstrated that rational 
appeal recipients generated the most irrelevant thoughts, followed by hope, and then fear 
appeal recipients. The only statistical difference emerged between the rational and fear 





generate fewer relevant thoughts than fear appeal recipients. Indeed, fear appeal 
recipients did generate the most relevant thoughts, followed by hope appeal recipients, 
and the rational appeal condition. Hypothesis 1 was partially supported.  
Hypothesis 2 posited that hope appeal recipients would have more supportive 
thoughts about the emotional appeal and fewer counterarguments than fear appeal 
recipients. Results demonstrated that hope appeal recipients did generate more supportive 
thoughts than the fear appeal or rational appeal conditions. No significant differences 
emerged between the groups with regards to counterarguing. Hypothesis 2 also was 
partially supported.  
Research questions 1 and 2 asked if emotional thoughts would vary as a function 
of emotional appeal, and if thoughts would “match” the type of emotional appeal 
received. Results showed that hope appeal recipients generated more hopeful thoughts 
than fear appeal or rational appeal recipients. Similarly, fear appeal recipients generated 
more fearful thoughts than hope or rational appeal recipients. 
Next, the potential effect of the emotional appeal induction on processing of 
recommendations was examined. Hypothesis 3 posited that hope appeal recipients would 
generate fewer supportive thoughts about the recommendations than fear appeal 
recipients. Results confirmed that the fear appeal recipients did list more supportive 
thoughts, regardless of recommendation quality. As hypothesized, the emotional appeal 
conditions did not elicit different amounts of counterarguments generated about the 
recommendations. Hypothesis 3 was supported. 
Hypothesis 4 posited that the interaction between emotional appeal type and 





recommendations. It was posited that rational appeal recipients who received high quality 
recommendations would generate more supportive thoughts than participants who 
received low quality recommendations. Emotional appeal recipients were not expected to 
differentiate between low and high quality recommendations. Results did not support this 
hypothesis—there was a strong main effect for recommendation quality, such that all 
recipients of high quality recommendations, regardless of appeal condition, generated 
more supportive thoughts than recipients of low quality recommendations.  
Research question 3 asked if the number of relevant or irrelevant thoughts about 
the recommendations would vary as a function of emotional appeal type and 
recommendation quality. Results revealed that recommendation quality did influence 
relevant versus irrelevant thought generation, such that low quality recommendation 
recipients had more relevant thoughts than high quality message recipients. There was no 
difference between recommendation quality conditions on the number of irrelevant 
thoughts generated. Emotional appeal conditions did not influence relevant or irrelevant 
thought generation about the recommendations.  
Research questions 4 and 5 asked if the amount of emotional thoughts and type of 
emotional thoughts would vary as a function of emotional appeal type and 
recommendation quality. Surprisingly, results revealed that rational appeal recipients had 
the most emotional thoughts about the recommendations, followed by fear appeal 
recipients and then hope appeal recipients, with statistical difference emerging between 
the rational and hope groups. The types of emotional thoughts generated did not vary 





 The next series of hypotheses and research questions examined recall of the 
recommendations and source. A memory recognition task was completed at the end of 
the study. Research question 6 asked if the total number of hits, misses, or false alarms 
would vary as a function of emotional appeal type. Results revealed that hope appeal 
recipients had more accurate recall (hits) than the fear appeal recipients. The conditions 
did not differ significantly in the amount of misses or false alarms. Next, recall as a 
function of recommendation quality was examined; results showed no significant 
differences in recall for high or low quality recommendations. The interaction between 
emotional appeal type and recommendation quality did not exert significant influence on 
recall.  
 Two path models were created to provide a visual presentation of the 
hypothesized influence of emotional appeals, appraisals, felt emotion, and 
recommendation quality on the cognitive processing of recommendations and behavioral 
intention. Based on the hypotheses presented in the main study, emotional appeals were 
posited to elicit appraisals of goal congruence, pleasantness, uncertainty, and importance. 
The hope appeal was predicted to cause appraisals of high goal congruence, high 
pleasantness, low levels of uncertainty, and high importance. This appraisal pattern was 
predicted to elicit felt hope. Fear appeals were predicted to cause appraisals of goal 
incongruence, unpleasantness, higher levels of uncertainty, and high importance.  This 
appraisal pattern was predicted to elicit felt fear. Felt fear and felt hope were expected to 
drive supportive thoughts and counterarguments about the recommendations. Perceived 
recommendation strength was included in the path model as an exogenous variable 





Finally, supportive thoughts were predicted to positively influence behavioral intentions; 
counterarguments were predicted to negatively influence behavioral intentions. Separate 
models, hypothesizing the same cognitive process, were created for hope appeal 
recipients and fear appeal recipients.  
    The first model run, based solely on theoretical predictions, did not have 
acceptable fit. Paths from pleasantness to supportive thoughts, importance to behavioral 
intentions, and goal congruence to behavioral intentions were added. The revised model 
was first tested for hope appeal recipients and showed satisfactory fit. Some support was 
provided for the model of processing of hope appeals proffered in this dissertation; that 
said, not all the predicted paths were significant.  That is, this set of data did not fully 
support the theoretical model put forth in this dissertation. Results demonstrate an 
interesting pattern for the hope appeal recipients. Felt hope was driven by appraisals of 
goal congruence, pleasantness, and uncertainty. Appraisals of unpleasantness and 
uncertainty predicted felt fear. Recommendation quality, felt hope, felt fear, and 
appraisals of pleasantness influenced supportive thought generation. Only 
recommendation quality significantly influenced counterargument generation. Goal 
congruence, importance, and counterarguments were the main drivers of behavioral 
intentions. Whereas the model was a good fit for this data, it did not do very well in 
predicting behavioral intentions.  
The revised model was a good fit for fear appeal recipients as well. Appraisals of 
unpleasantness and importance predicted some of the variance in felt fear. Feelings of 
hope were predicted by appraisals of pleasantness and importance. Perceived 





counterarguments. Supportive thoughts and appraisals of importance predicted behavioral 
intention; again, the majority of variance in behavioral intentions was not accounted for 
in this model.  
These post-hoc models were provided for descriptive purposes. The data was not 
collected in a format amenable to modeling; future researchers desiring to create causal 
models of hope and fear appeal processing should collect multiple indicators for each 
variable and conduct multi-sample SEM to allow for direct comparison (Kline, 1998).  
That said, the models provide a visual interpretation of the results presented through 
hypothesis testing. It was interesting that the additional paths between the appraisals and 
outcome measures were needed to fit the model to this data set. Theory would dictate that 
felt emotion mediates the relationship between appraisals and outcomes; this data set 
shows only partial mediation. There are at least two explanations why this result was 
obtained. First, it may be that emotion does not fully mediate the relationship between 
appraisal and outcome. Or, it could be that this data set was abnormal; path models 
reflect the data that are provided and are not sensitive to theoretical concerns.   
Implications 
This dissertation centers on examining how hope appeals are processed in 
persuasive contexts. Results supported the argument that hope appeal recipients would 
have little reason to argue the appeal or question its veracity. They generated many more 
supportive thoughts than counterarguments about its contents. It was hypothesized that 
hope appeals may cause biased or shallow processing of recommendations, as hopeful 
people would want to maintain their positive state. The results of this study provide no 





processing of the recommendations. Although hope shares the appraisals of pleasantness 
and goal congruence with other positive emotions, it did not behave like a prototypical 
positive emotion in terms of processing. In fact, results clearly demonstrate that hope 
cannot be conflated with more traditional types of positive affect studied in the mood and 
messaging paradigm. Hope seemed to focus participants. They generated few irrelevant 
thoughts about the emotional appeal, and were sensitive to recommendation quality 
manipulations. Moreover, hope appeal recipients had the most accurate recall.  Instead of 
distracting or decreasing accuracy motivation, hope seemingly facilitated processing. 
These results reinforce the call by Griskevicius et al. (2010) to examine discrete positive 
emotions without the assumption that they are all peripherally processed.  
 Results of this study demonstrate that participants in all experimental conditions 
closely processed the appeal and recommendations. This effect is demonstrated through 
the small number of irrelevant thoughts, the discernment between low and high quality 
recommendations in all conditions, and overall highly accurate recognition. There are a 
few potential explanations for the difference in the predictions and the results for this 
study. First, it could be that the demand characteristics elicited from an online study 
focused readers in. The highly unrealistic nature of the study could have caused 
participants to pay closer attention to the messages than they would in a natural setting. It 
could be that the high level of importance about the topic focused participants, such that 
emotional appeal type did not exert a significant influence on its own. If high importance 
were driving processing, then the body of literature reviewed in this dissertation would 
suggest that highly relevant topics could cause systematic processing, such that study 





that the messages were not complex enough to cause processing differences across 
conditions. 
The findings of the current study lend support for an alternative model of message 
processing, the Unimodel (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999). The Unimodel posits that 
motivation, capacity, and complexity of information drive information processing. The 
lack of message complexity could play the most important role in explaining the findings 
in this study. It could be that the messages were not complex enough to tax the reader or 
require much effort. The pro-attitudinal nature of the messaging may have also facilitated 
processing. Most of the extant research on the effects of mood on persuasive message 
processing employed counter-attitudinal messages in their studies (Mackie & Worth, 
1989; Smith & Shaffer, 1991). The ways in which counter-attitudinal appeals could elicit 
hope is outside the purview of this dissertation, but worthy of consideration in future 
research. 
The lack of attention to the source in this study can also be explained via 
Unimodel scholarship. Kruglanski and Thompson (1999) documented a biasing effect, 
wherein presentation order biases interpretation of subsequent information. In this study, 
the source was consistently presented after the recommendations. The lack of differences 
between the high and low quality sources on perceived source expertise can be attributed 
to the quality of the recommendations presented. That is, sources that were presented 
after the high quality recommendations were rated as having higher levels of perceived 






 While not in line with the predictions, the strong effect of recommendation 
quality on thought listing is congruent with persuasion literature. When a topic is more 
involving, participants are expected to distinguish between weak and strong arguments 
(Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). It was posited that emotion could potentially 
bias cognitive processing. That did not happen in terms of the processing measures used 
in this study. Participants, regardless of emotional condition, distinguished between high 
and low quality recommendations. The findings of this investigation are also consistent 
with Kruglanski’s Unimodel, which posits that arguments that are relevant are processed 
more closely.   
Limitations  
The first limitation of this study is the use of a single topic, which limits the 
generalizability of the findings (Jackson, 1992). It is conceivable that effects could differ 
with the use of a different topic. The topic was chosen because it elicited all the necessary 
appraisals associated with hope and fear, especially personal importance. Other studies of 
hope appeals using more global topics, such as climate change and influenza, were not 
able to elicit significant levels of hope (Chadwick, 2011). Overall, the use of a single 
topic impedes the ability to generalize the study results.  
Ecological validity is also a limitation of this study. Experiments allow for more 
control, but lack realism. The experiment was conducted online, so that participants could 
be in a more naturalistic setting. That said, the demand characteristics of an experimental 
study create different conditions than the real world situations in which people receive 
messages. Additionally, the use of a convenience sample also limits the generalizability. 





messages were tailored and pilot tested on similar students, different results could be 
attained with a random sample. Moreover, the samples in this study come from a more 
affluent background. A minority of the participants reported family incomes below 
$100,000 in the previous year; results for this study may vary widely if students with 
more financial pressures were participants.   
The lack of differences in the recall condition are likely due to limitations in 
measurement, but fall in life with the findings of Liberman and Chaiken’s (1992) 
investigation of biased processing. The high importance of the topic did not motivate 
participants to engage in defensive inattention, and so participants in all conditions were 
highly accurate in their recall. That said, more time should have elapsed between the 
messages and memory recognition task.  
Future Research  
Hope and other types of emotional appeals are often deemed appropriate for use 
by communication practitioners who craft marketing, health, political, and pro-social 
campaigns. Whereas a variety of discrete emotional appeals have persuasive potential 
(Nabi, 1999; Witte, 1992; Turner, 2007; Turner & Underhill, in press), a dearth of 
scholarship exists on the efficacy of these appeals. Practitioners use emotional appeals 
without theoretical guidance or appreciation for their potential maladaptive 
consequences.  Future research should seek to further develop message design theory. 
This investigation was a small first step toward developing theory on how hope appeals 






 Future research on emotional appeals should also include efficacy as a predictor 
variable. Efficacy was used as a covariate in this study. This was perhaps imprudent, 
considering the important role that efficacy plays in other emotion-based models (AAM, 
Turner, 2007; EPPM, Witte, 1992). These models posit that felt emotion interacts with 
efficacy to influence risk perceptions, attitudes, and behavioral intentions. The same 
could be true for hope appeals.   
Advice for Practitioners 
Although not the central focus, this dissertation provides some guidance on how 
to design messages for young adults about their personal finances. There is a serious 
disconnect between perceptions of those entering college and reality for those graduating. 
A survey of 16-18 year olds found that teens on average believed they would obtain a 
starting salary of $73,000 upon college graduation and earn on average $150,000 per year 
once they established themselves (Charles Schwab, 2011). In reality, some 50 percent of 
recent college graduates are unemployed or underemployed (White, 2012). Student loan 
debt in the United States has now surpassed $1 trillion, and the average graduate owes 
$25,000; more people are in default on student loans than consumer debt (Raum, 2012). 
Student loan delinquency can have many serious consequences: reduced credit scores, 
negative impacts on ability to borrow money in the future, collections, and wage 
garnishments (Cunningham & Kienzl, 2011). Moreover, student debt is not isolated to 
loans. At least 91% of undergraduates have a credit card, with the average number of 
cards per student at 4.6 (Sallie Mae, 2009). A 2008 survey showed that the average 
college graduate is over $4,000 in credit card debt; 25% of students have paid a late fee 





Bourassa, 2008). These types of debts can be devastating to those attempting to establish 
financial independence after graduation. A lack of awareness and knowledge about the 
negative consequences of credit cards and loans are arguably to blame for the poor 
financial decision making among many college students (Mierzwinski, Lindstrom, & 
Bourassa, 2008).  
 Efforts to engage college students in financial literacy are gaining popularity 
(Charles Schwab, 2011); that said, most universities have not implemented any type of 
financial education classes into the core curriculum. The cost and effort to enroll in 
financial education courses often makes them unappealing to people of all ages. 
Communication practitioners are therefore uniquely poised to help address this issue by 
crafting messages to persuade young people to engage their financial health and 
wellbeing.  
Emotional appeals should be considered as a message design strategy for those 
working in financial literacy. That said, research has shown that fear appeals directed at 
college-aged participants often cause reactance and maladaptive outcomes (Dillard & 
Shen, 2005; Rains & Turner, 2007). The results of this study demonstrate that students 
were open to the use of both fear and hope appeals on the topic of personal financial 
security. Participants read the messages and associated recommendations closely and 
elaborated their thoughts on the topic. The hope appeals were superior in eliciting 
supportive thought and accurate recall; therefore, more research and consideration of the 
potential efficacy of using hope appeals in financial literacy promotion and other pro-







Pilot 1: Summary of EFA for Perceived Financial Efficacy using Principal Axis Factoring 
 (N =99) 
 
 
 Factor Loadings 
Item Establish  Budget Accuracy 
Purchase an automobile after graduation .775 .180 .183 
Choose the best type of retirement plan .761 .285 .216 
Secure automobile insurance .758 .310 .078 
Begin saving for retirement .677 .209 .113 
Not rely on financial support from family .665 .139 .146 
Pay student loan bills .652 .223 .147 
Secure health insurance .586 .371 .275 
Save enough money for an emergency fund that 
would cover all bills for 3 months 
 
.557 .496 .026 
Secure renter’s insurance .547 .382 .382 
Earn money from investments .532 -.105 .396 
Secure needed loans .525 .349 .401 
Not need to borrow money .519 .290 -.089 
Invest money into stocks or bonds .515 -.004 .373 
Stick to a personal budget .165 .771 .077 
Create a realistic personal budget .169 .743 .123 
Pay bills in a timely manner .229 .644 .261 
Manage a credit card .357 .620 .160 
Check the accuracy of a bank statement .098 .459 .446 
Balance your checkbook .019 .461 .780 
Accurately file personal income tax documents .404 .111 .496 
Eigenvalues 8.363 1.661 .955 






Pilot study of emotional appeals: Means and standard deviations for dependent variables 






Importance Pleasantness Certainty Persuasion 



































































Pilot Study 3: Recommendations, means, and standard deviations for perceived recommendation quality 
 M SD 
1. Transportation and housing can take a lot of your monthly income, which means you may not be able 
to afford other needs like food and a cell phone. Make wise choices and choose a living situation and 
transportation that give you a financial cushion. 
 
5.25 1.04 
*2. Track your spending for the last three months using your bank statement and receipts. This will give 
you an idea of where your "extra" money is going and how much you could have saved if you hadn't 
made some unnecessary purchases or wasted cash. 
 
5.71 .91 
*3. Pay attention to bank fees. Review your statements each month for unnecessary charges. 
Oftentimes, using your debit card as a credit card (and not entering your pin) will help you avoid extra 
charges and penalties. Make sure you are familiar with your account’s policies. 
 
5.49 1.06 
*4. Pack a lunch or bring a drink and snacks to class. Pieces of fruit, granola bars, and reusable water 
bottles provide healthy alternatives. You can save a lot of money by just planning ahead and not buying 
snacks, meals, or drinks on campus. 
 
5.80 .93 
*5. Open a credit card with a low interest rate that will build up your credit score; but, only use credit 
cards if you can afford to pay off charges within a month. An open credit card account will help you 
build credit over time. 
 
5.50 .99 
6. Avoid eating out at expensive restaurants with your friends. When you have a kitchen, invite them 
over to your place and have a potluck. Spending time with your friends should be about socializing and 
having fun, not spending money and going into debt unnecessarily. 
 
5.25 1.12 
^7. Make sure you are only in relationships with people who have a similar commitment to financial 
stability. Do not date someone who wastes money. Stay single and have fun with friends. Distance 







Table 4 (continued) 
Recommendations, means, and standard deviations for perceived recommendation quality 
 
M SD 
^8. Start investing most of your money in your retirement fund now. You should open a Roth IRA to 
maximize your savings for retirement. Earnest saving will pay dividends in future decades. You should 
not assume you will receive social security benefits or a pension. 
 
4.54 1.22 
9. Invest at least $500 per month in a mutual fund to have a post-graduation nest. It is taking months, 
even years, for some new graduates to secure employment. Even if you move back home with your 
parents, you will have necessary expenses to cover. 
 
4.75 1.09 
^10. Instead of focusing on school, work as much as you can during the semester and save all the 
money you earn for post graduation when you cannot find a job. Unemployed people can easily get into 
financial trouble. Save money now to avoid pain later. 
 
3.11 1.28 
^11. Destroy your credit cards. Debit cards should be used judiciously for ATM withdrawals. All of 
your financials should be handled with a cash budget. Use a jar for each major expense and put a set 
amount of cash in the jar each week. 
3.52 1.35 
 






Table  5 
Pilot Study 3: Sources, means, and standard deviations for perceived source expertise 
 M SD 
 





















6. Parker Williams, Teller at a local bank. 4.37 1.07 
 
*highest rated source 













Main Study- Correlations of the items in the Perceived Financial Efficacy Scale   
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1. Create Budget 1.00                    
2. Stick to Budget .618 1.00                   
3. Pay Bills .543 .504 1.00                  
4. Secure Loans .398 .324 .425 1.00                 
5. Not Borrow .248 .252 .323 .275 1.00                
6.  No Family Support .233 .258 .327 .449 .564 1.00               
7. Emergency Fund .359 .337 .389 .436 .463 .506 1.00              
8. Health Insurance .345 .318 .443 .620 .355 .492 .443 1.00             
9. Renters Insurance .316 .321 .429 .611 .367 .510 .546 .641 1.00            
10.Auto Insurance .356 .327 .443 .623 .322 .450 .448 .675 .659 1.00           
11. Retirement .273 .295 .339 .424 .401 .519 .493 .487 .574 .496 1.00          
12. Balance Checkbook .464 .420 .509 .456 .215 .257 .313 .397 .410 .461 .289 1.00         
13. Bank Statement .513 .449 .549 .376 .241 .244 .270 .360 .357 .387 .235 .590 1.00        
14. Credit Card .554 .467 .521 .445 .263 .300 .333 .365 .417 .420 .345 .477 .488 1.00       
15. Taxes .298 .256 .302 .422 .262 .433 .388 .431 .500 .478 .415 .424 .385 .324 1.00      
16. Retirement .293 .287 .299 .522 .380 .527 .507 .557 .613 .527 .672 .375 .296 .357 .514 1.00     
17. Investments .270 .215 .270 .422 .374 .453 .451 .450 .452 .473 .575 .299 .255 .340 .408 .567 1.00    
18. Earn from Investments .269 .257 .344 .482 .394 .487 .473 .479 .566 .511 .562 .371 .288 .331 .418 .608 .722 1.00   
19. Purchase Auto .227 
 
.233 .306 .458 .387 .524 .476 .539 .555 .607 .512 .275 .194 .319 .419 .491 .451 .466 1.00  
20. Pay student loans .309 .297 .408 .534 .349 .528 .442 .503 .491 .511 .405 .377 .359 .383 .396 .434 .351 .387 .467 1.00 






Main Experiment: Means and standard deviations for emotional appeal manipulation checks 
  Felt 
Hope 
Felt Fear  Goal 
Congruence 
Importance Pleasantness Certainty Persuasion 
































































































Main Experiment: Manipulation checks for the recommendations and source quality manipulations  
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Low Quality Recommendations 
















Low Quality Recommendations 
















High Quality Recommendations 














High Quality Recommendations  




















Means and standard deviations for thoughts generated about the emotional appeals 













































































































Table 10  
Means and standard deviations for thoughts generated about the recommendations, as a function of emotional appeal received 
 



























































































































































































































































Means and standard deviations for thoughts generated about the recommendations, as a function of the interaction between 
emotional appeal and recommendation quality 
 






















Low Recs  

















































































Low Recs  









































































Low Recs  

















































































Means and standard deviations for total recall, as a function of emotional appeal received 
 
 
  Total Hits  Total Misses   Total False Alarms   


























































Means and standard deviations for total recall, as a function of recommendation quality  
 
  Total Hits  Total Misses   Total False Alarms   



























































































   Total Hits  Total Misses Total False Alarms 







Low Recs  














































Low Recs  














































Low Recs  



















































Post-hoc path model: Correlation matrix and standard deviations for hope appeal recipients  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 





         





1.00         
3. Uncertainty 
 
.534** .327** 1.00  
 




.135* .119 .013 1.00  
 
      
5. Felt Hope 
 
  
.605** .789** .263* .068 1.00  
 
     
6. Felt Fear 
 
 
-.364** -.551** -.055 -.132 -.416** 1.00  
 




.137* .159* .183** .082 .185** -.093 1.00  
 
   
8. Supportive Thoughts 
 






.064 -.008 -.021 .043 -.098 -.011 -.657** -.433** 1.00  
 
 
10. Behavioral Intention 
 
.289** .059 .044 .426** .069 -.140* .030 -.042 .165*  
 
1.00 
SD 1.07 1.20 1.03 1.06 1.40 1.35 1.68 1.07 1.17 1.06 
  







Post-hoc path model: Correlation matrix and standard deviations for fear appeal recipients  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 















.717** .583** 1.00  
 




-.278** -.316** -.307** 1.00  
 
      
5. Felt Hope  
 
 
.497** .782** .496** -.365** 1.00  
 
     
6. Felt Fear 
 
 
-.116 -.409** -.118 .299** -.464** 1.00  
 




.042 -.041 .096 .08 -.01 .093 1.00  
 
   
8. Supportive Thoughts 
 






-.143* -.155* -.252** .128 -.144** -.035 -.539** -.402** 1.00  
 
 
10. Behavioral Intention 
 
-.231** -.245** -.238** .501** -.130 .147* .153* .192** . 029 1.00 
SD 
 
1.16 1.02 1.24 1.05 1.18 1.35 1.65 1.19 1.18 1.09 























ImportanceFelt Hope  
 
-.051(.056) -.91 












Felt HopeSupportive Thoughts 
 
-.25(.071) -3.53 
Felt FearSupportive Thoughts 
 
.017(.054) .31 
Pleasantness Supportive Thoughts 
 
.28(.09) 3.12 






Felt FearCounterarguments  
 
-.065(.051) -1.29 
Recommendation QualityCounterarguments  
 
-.46(.037) -12.49 
Supportive Thoughts Behavioral Intention 
 
.0045(.067) .068 
CounterargumentsBehavioral Intention .12(.062) 1.99 
Goal CongruenceBehavioral Intention .23(.061) 6.36 
























ImportanceFelt Hope  
 
-.14(.053) -2.70 












Felt HopeSupportive Thoughts 
 
.16(.095) 1.67 






Recommendation Quality Supportive Thoughts 
 
.39(.043) 9.06 
Felt HopeCounterarguments  
 
-.18(.063) -2.87 






Supportive Thoughts Behavioral Intention 
 
.16(.061) 2.52 
CounterargumentsBehavioral Intention .024(.062) .38 
Goal CongruenceBehavioral Intention -.076(.06) -1.27 






Hope Appeal  
Today’s college graduates have more debt than their predecessors; the average college 
graduate has more than $23,000 of debt. But, recent grades should feel confident about 
finding work to pay off these loans after graduation. You probably know some people 
that have had trouble finding jobs; but with perseverance, most graduates are eventually 
finding good jobs and reaping the reward of their discipline. 
 
You should have a lot of hope for your future and faith in the American millennial 
generation to succeed. As a college student, you may look at the national economic 
situation and worry about your future. While most students wait until after graduation to 
get serious about their personal finances, it can be very beneficial to develop your 
knowledge about smart money habits now, putting you on the right path for the future. 
 
Financial analysts forecast that the economy will improve in coming years. There should 
be jobs and opportunities available. The market has already made significant recovery. 
But you cannot be dependent solely upon the whims of our global economy and the 
unknown of the future. You should empower yourself with the knowledge and skills to 
succeed. 
 
The future challenges you face are real and should be taken seriously. They will not be 
met easily or in a short span of time. But, feel confident that you can and will meet these 
challenges. There are plenty of reasons to believe that obstacles can be overcome and that 
you can make smart financial decisions. The hope for your generation’s prosperity and 
happiness is still alive, especially within you. You will next be provided 
recommendations from a financial expert about how to navigate your financial future. 
 
Fear Appeal  
Today’s college graduates have more debt than their predecessors; the average college 
graduate has more than $23,000 of debt. Students should be worried about finding work 
to pay off these loans after graduation. Some 37 percent of 18- to 29-year-olds are 
unemployed or out of the workforce entirely. Even with perseverance, most graduates are 
not finding good jobs; and many are still not being rewarded for their discipline.  
 
You should have heavy anxiety about your future, and little faith in the American 
millennial generation to succeed overall. As a college student, the national economic 
situation should make you worry about your future. Most students wait until after 
graduation to get serious about their personal finances. You should not wait—developing 







Financial analysts forecast that the economy will not improve in coming years. The stock 
market has made almost no recovery. As if this isn’t bad enough, there will not be enough 
jobs or opportunities available for graduates. You cannot be dependent solely upon the 
whims of our global economy and the unknown of the future. You must equip yourself 
with the knowledge and skills to succeed.  
 
The future challenges you face are real; they are serious and many. They will not be met 
easily or in a short span of time. But, not meeting these challenges could be devastating. 
There are few reasons to believe that obstacles can be overcome and that you can always 
make smart financial decisions. The fear for your generation’s poverty and despair is 
overwhelming. You will next be provided recommendations about how to navigate your 
financial future. 
 
Rational Appeal  
Personal finance is a really important topic. A solid credit history and excellent FICO 
credit score are extremely valuable. A credit score in the United States represents the 
worthiness of a person to get a loan, and the likelihood that person will pay debts. A 
credit score makes up a large portion of the credit report that lenders use to judge an 
applicant's credit risk and whether to extend a loan. A high credit score can save you 
thousands in mortgage interest, lower your auto insurance premiums, and affect your 
career. For all their importance, however, a lot of confusion surrounds credit reports and 
scores. 
 
There are three major credit bureaus, not just one: Equifax, TransUnion and Experian 
each track information about how consumers use credit. Based on that information, each 
credit bureau also maintains FICO credit scores for each consumer in its database. As a 
result, you have three credit reports and multiple credit scores. And because each credit 
bureau typically has slightly different information about your credit history, the FICO 
credit score generated from each of the credit bureaus also tends to vary, sometimes 
significantly. 
 
Credit reports and scores are different: While your FICO credit score is generated based 
on information in your credit report, it’s important to understand the difference between 
the two. Your credit report shows your history of using credit, including the accounts you 
have (both opened and closed), your payment history, credit limits, and amounts owed. 
Your FICO credit score is generated based on this information, and generally ranges from 
a low of 300 to a high of 850. You will next be provided recommendations about how to 







Measures for Main Dissertation Study 
2. We are first wondering about the general way you think about the world. 
 















I hardly ever expect things to go my way. 
 
I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking. 
 
I'm always optimistic about my future. 
 
I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to 
challenge my thinking abilities. 
 
I would prefer complex to simple problems. 
 
I always look on the bright side of things. 
 
Thinking is not my idea of fun. 
 
In uncertain times, I usually expect the best. 
 
If something can go wrong for me, it will. 
 
Things never work out the way I want them to. 
 
3. Exposure to Appeal 
 
4. We are interested in what you were thinking when you read this message. Even if you 
were not really thinking about the message—let us know. Please list the thoughts, any 
thoughts, you had while reading the message. Separate different thoughts with commas.  
 
5. It is common for messages to cause distinct feelings in people; this may or may not be 
true for you. What did the message make you feel? How much of each of the following 























The message made me feel positive. 
 
The content of this message was alarming. 
 
The message made me feel hopeful. 
The contents of the message scared me. 
 
Reading this message made me feel enthusiastic. 
 
The message made me feel irate. 
 
Reading the message made me feel encouraged. 
 
The message made me feel frightened. 
 
The message made me feel despair. 
 
Reading this message made me feel optimistic. 
 
The content of the message made me feel anxious. 
 
The message made me feel fearful. 
 
Reading this message made me feel negative. 
 
6. Please provide your reaction to the message you read. 
 
Opinions about the Message 
 
















The message was troubling.  
 






The message made me feel good about the future. 
 
The message contained positive information. 
 
The message was negatively toned. 
 
The message was pleasant to read. 
 
The message was unacceptable. 
 
 The message was wrong.  
 
The message was negative.  
 
The message was intelligent.  
 
The message was smart.  
 
The message was bad.  
 
7. A few more questions about the message you just read. 
 















The message was consistent with your personal goals. 
 
The message communicated that it is more possible than not that you can avoid 
accumulating debt after graduation. 
 
The message made financial success after graduation seem more possible. 
 
The message communicated that it is more possible than not that you can get a job within 
6 months graduation. 
 
The message contained information that you are likely to achieve your post-graduation 
goals. 
 
The message communicated that it is more possible than not that you will be able to 






The message communicated that it is more possible than not that you can create financial 
security after graduation without assistance. 
 
The message made achieving financial goals after graduation seem more likely. 
 
The message was compatible with your ideas. 
 
8. How important is financial security to YOU? 
 

















Financial Security is irrelevant to me. 
 
Financial Security is important to me. 
 
Financial Security has no bearing on me. 
 
Financial Security is of no concern to me. 
 
9. You will now be given some recommendations to guide you toward financial security. 
 
14. We are interested in what you were thinking when you read the recommendations. 
Even if you were not really thinking about the recommendations—let us know. Please list 
the thoughts, any thoughts you had while reading the recommendations: 
 
15. Perceptions of the Recommendations 
 
 
















The recommendations were good. 
 
The recommendations were illogical. 
 






The recommendations were weak. 
 
The recommendations were effective. 
 
16. Please indicate your perceptions about the source of the recommendations. 
 






































































I will do what I can to prepare for financial independence after graduation. 
 
I will make a plan to achieve financial independence after graduation. 
 
I plan to be more proactive to attain financial independence after graduation. 
 
I intend to take steps to plan for financial independence after graduation. 
 
18. We are wondering if you have any interest in learning more about financial literacy. 
 
Response Options for Each Question:  
 
YES NO  MAYBE 
 
Would you be interested in attending a workshop focused on teaching financial literacy to 
college students? 
 
Would you be interested in signing up for a webinar on financial literacy for college 
students? 
 
Would you be interested in enrolling in a free, semester-long workshop on financial 
literacy for college students? 
Would you be interested in enrolling in a 1 credit course on financial literacy for college 
students? 
 
19. We are wondering how you perceive your ability to complete the following tasks 



















Begin saving for retirement  
 






Pay bills in a timely manner  
 
Secure needed loans  
 
Invest money into stocks or bonds 
 
Not rely on financial support from family 
 
Manage a credit card  
 
Secure health insurance  
 
Check the accuracy of a bank statement 
 
Secure auto insurance  
 
Create a realistic personal budget 
 
Accurately file personal income tax documents 
 
Pay student loan bills  
 
Save enough money for an emergency fund that would cover all bills for 3 months 
 
Balance your checkbook  
 
Choose the best type of retirement plan 
 
Not need to borrow money  
 
Earn money from investments  
Purchase an automobile if needed 
 
Secure renter’s insurance  
 
20. We would like to know how you think about managing finances generally. 
 
Orientation toward Financial Issues 
 



















When I encounter information about managing finances, I focus on only a few key points. 
 
It is important for me to interpret information about managing finances in a way that 
applies directly to my life. 
 
After I encounter information about managing finances, I am likely to stop and think 
about it. 
 
When I see or hear information about managing finances, I rarely spend much time 
thinking about it. 
 
If I need to figure out how to manage my finances, the more viewpoints I get the better. 
 
When I encounter information about managing finances, I read or listen to most of it, 
even though I may not agree with its perspective. 
 
There is far more information on managing finances than I personally need. 
 
After thinking about managing my finances, I have a broader understanding. 
 
If I have to act on managing my finances, the advice of one expert is good enough for me. 
 
21. Please indicate the statements that were provided as recommendations to you earlier 
in the study. 
 
Which Recommendations Did You Read? 
 
Pack a lunch or bring a drink and snacks to class. Pieces of fruit, granola bars, and 
reusable water bottles provide healthy alternatives. You can save a lot of money by just 
planning ahead and not buying snacks, meals, or drinks on campus. 
 
Invest at least $500 per month in a mutual fund to have a post-graduation nest. It is taking 
months, even years, for some new graduates to secure employment. Even if you move 
back home with your parents, you will have necessary expenses to cover. 
 
Pay attention to bank fees. Review your statements each month for unnecessary charges. 
Oftentimes, using your debit card as a credit card (and not entering your pin) will help 
you avoid extra charges and penalties. Make sure you are familiar with your account’s 
policies. 
 
Instead of focusing on school, work as much as you can during the semester and save all 
the money you earn for post graduation when you cannot find a job. Unemployed people 






Transportation and housing can take a lot of your monthly income, which means you may 
not be able to afford other needs like food and a cell phone. Make wise choices and 
choose a living situation and transportation that give you a financial cushion. 
 
Open a credit card with a low interest rate that will build up your credit score; but, only 
use credit cards if you can afford to pay off charges within a month. An open credit card 
account will help you build credit over time. 
 
Destroy your credit cards. Debit cards should be used judiciously for ATM withdrawals. 
All of your financials should be handled with a cash budget. Use a jar for each major 
expense and put a set amount of cash in the jar each week. 
 
Make sure you are only in relationships with people who have a similar commitment to 
financial stability. Do not date someone who wastes money. Stay single and have fun 
with friends. Distance yourself from people who want you to spend money or use credit. 
 
Drinking at home can save a lot of money. When going out with friends, partake at home 
first or not at all. Order water at restaurants and bars. Have friends over for celebrations. 
Ask everyone to bring their own food and drinks. 
 
Track your spending for the last three months using your bank statement and receipts. 
This will give you an idea of where your "extra" money is going and how much you 
could have saved if you hadn't made some unnecessary purchases or wasted cash. 
 
Avoid eating out at expensive restaurants with your friends. When you have a kitchen, 
invite them over to your place and have a potluck. Spending time with your friends 
should be about socializing and having fun, not spending money and going into debt 
unnecessarily. 
 
Start investing most of your money in your retirement fund now. You should open a Roth 
IRA to maximize your savings for retirement. Earnest saving will pay dividends in future 
decades. You should not assume you will receive social security benefits or a pension. 
 
22. Which source provided the recommendations you read?  
 
Rory Jackson, Sophomore Communication major 
 
Taylor Martin, Personal financial advisor at an investment firm 
 
Riley Jones, President of a nonprofit financial literacy organization 
 
Cameron Smith, Freshman at UMD and writer for "The Diamondback" 
 





Parker Williams, Teller at a local bank 
 




23. My age is __________ years. 
 















Other (please specify) 
 






Other (please specify) 
 















28. Please think about the total income for all members of your household in 2011. Please 
mark the range in which your family income falls. If you are uncertain, please give your 
best guess. 












Other (please specify) 
 
29. Please enter your SONA ID to receive credit for your study participation. Your 
SONA ID is a five digit code number that can be found in your SONA account. 




Hello, my name is Jill Underhill. I am a graduate student in the Department of 
Communication at The University of Maryland. Under the supervision of Dr. Dale 
Hample, this study is part of my dissertation investigating how people respond to 
financial topics. You were asked to participate in the study because you are in a 
communication undergraduate class. You are one of approximately 650 people in the 
study. 
 
This study aims to discover how people’s emotion, specifically hope and fear, are related 
to attitude change and behavioral intentions in financial contexts. Hope and fear are 
normal emotions and I am available to discuss any further thoughts or concerns elicited 
from answering the questionnaire. Please feel free to contact me at jmc12@umd.edu. 
Please note the message and recommendations you viewed today were created for use in 
this study. Thank you again for participating. We appreciate your time. Please refrain 
from telling other students about the purpose of this study. 
 
30. Enter your email address below if you would like to be entered into the raffle for a 
$200 Amazon.com gift card. Your email address will be separated from your responses. 
Email addresses will not be used for any other purpose. Study credit is not dependent 
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